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Abstract 
From 2011 to 2015, a rise in anti-Americanism was strongly reflected in Russian 
public opinion during President Vladimir Putin’s third term. The study examined the 
phenomenon of anti-Americanism in Russia and the role of state-controlled mass media in 
promoting anti-American attitudes. Statistical analysis of polls conducted in Russia by the 
Pew Research Center in 2012 demonstrated that anti-Americanism in Russian society 
should not be treated as a monolithic phenomenon. A segment of the Russian populace 
held a strong and deep-seated anti-American ideological bias that affected its perception of 
everything related to the United States. Other sentiments, however, fit a more complex 
structure congruent with Chiozza’s dimensions of America theory. These respondents 
simultaneously held different opinions towards aspects of the United States and its 
influence. The data indicated that in Russia, at least on the level of the mass public, 
American soft power did not promote a positive attitude towards the United States.  
Analysis of polls conducted by the independent Levada Center in Moscow from 2011 to 
2015 provided additional insights into the relationship between Russian mass media and 
anti-Americanism. The rise of anti-Americanism was detected across the audiences of 
various mass news media. Respondents who preferred different sources of information 
showed similar patterns in their shifting attitudes towards the United States. Major 
increases in anti-Americanism among all of the respondents occurred when Putin 
intensified his anti-western and anti-American rhetoric, and when the Russian mass media 
launched an aggressive anti-American propaganda campaign.  
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Preface 
 “I cannot forecast to you the action of Russia. It is a riddle wrapped in a mystery 
inside an enigma; but perhaps there is a key.”  
Winston Churchill, 1939.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction  
 
The morning of January 31, 1990, was cold in Moscow. Regardless, thousands of 
people gathered outside a small building with golden arches above the entrance 
(Kushelevich, 2014a). They were waiting for the moment when McDonald’s staff, wearing 
green uniforms, would open the doors and let them, for the first time, step into the world-
famous restaurant that had just opened in the Soviet Union. Photos of that event show 
thousands of Soviet citizens waiting in anticipation. One of the photos pictured a man who 
had tucked several colorful paper flags with McDonald’s arches on them into his traditional 
Russian fur hat.   
For the people waiting that day, McDonald’s was more than a diner serving 
hamburgers and fries. It was the symbol of the West, of the United States, and the American 
way of life. Mitya Kushelevich, one of the first customers of the fast-food restaurant, 
described the symbolic meaning of the opening of McDonald’s in the Soviet Union:  
Everything about this particular branch of the American fast-food giant was 
iconic for a person born in Soviet Russia. Just as St Petersburg was once 
considered our ‘window to Europe,’ this restaurant was our ‘window to the 
world.’ Opened on the last day of 1990, the last New Year’s eve of the 
U.S.S.R.’s existence, for a symbolic yearly rent of one ruble, the 
McDonald’s represented the change that we’d all been waiting for…. 
Everybody wanted to try it, from the janitor to the professor. The queues 
were long, forming rings around the square like a gargantuan python trying 
to squeeze the life out of the trees and the fountains within. We didn’t know 
what fast food was. We thought McDonald’s was a proper restaurant 
serving American cuisine; it probably tasted like freedom and we wanted to 
sample it (Kushelevich, 2014b). 
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The Soviet people who lined up in long queues were eagerly awaiting more than a 
Big Mac and their appetite was for more than fries. These Soviets were awaiting the 
Western free market and the economic prosperity they saw it brought to the U.S. Their 
appetite was for all things Western.  
Twenty five years later, the values and systems once so hungered for now repulse. 
The appeal of the West has waned, and the love affair with all things Western has ended. 
The attitudes of the Russian people and the Russian authorities towards the United States 
and the West have dramatically shifted. In a move that can be interpreted as a symbolic 
gesture, a number of McDonald’s restaurants were shut down by the Russian authorities in 
the fall of 2014 including the very first location on the Pushkin square. According to 
Birnbaum (2015), after reopening “McDonald’s started an advertising campaign 
emphasizing its local ties and its 25-year history in Russia, playing down the Golden 
Arches’ global significance as a bright beacon of America.” The new McDonald’s 
billboards simply read, “Made in Russia, for Russians.”  
In recent years, rampant anti-Americanism has consumed Russian society, from the 
rhetoric of public officials, to hard newscasts, to the attitudes of ordinary people in the 
streets. According to a survey conducted by the Levada Center (Vasiliev, 2015), an 
independent Russian polling organization, by the fall of 2015 a majority of Russians 
believed that U.S.-Russia relations were either "tense" (45%) or "hostile" (29%). A similar 
survey by Levada showed that almost 80% of the Russian public held negative views 
toward the United States. 
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This dramatic rise of anti-Americanism in modern Russia presents a number of 
fundamental questions. What factors made possible such a dramatic shift of attitudes and 
opinions? How persistent are the anti-American attitudes, and what are the main aspects of 
the United States, its soft power and policies that are viewed negatively by the Russian 
public? What other aspects of public opinion influence anti-Americanism? And finally, 
what was the role of state-controlled mass media in planting and cultivating this degree of 
anti-Americanism in Russia in 2015? This dissertation is an attempt to address these 
questions by conducting an in-depth examination of the seemingly entrenched level of anti-
Americanism in Russia.   
Growing anti-Americanism is by no means a uniquely Russian matter. Negative 
sentiments towards the United States steadily rose around much of the globe during the 
early twenty-first century (Chiozza, 2010). Public opinion polls conducted in a wide range 
of countries demonstrated rising levels of anti-American attitudes across countries and 
cultures, even in countries traditionally viewed as allies of the United States (Pew Research 
Center, 2012). On some occasions, severe anti-Americanism transmitted from mindset and 
rhetoric into violence and terrorist acts against the United States and its citizens.  
There are, however, unique elements and trends of anti-Americanism as examined 
in the context of Russia, and although not overtly violent possibly more troubling in terms 
of America’s long-term standing on the geopolitical world stage.  From 2011 to 2015, 
tensions and animosity between the two countries were reminiscent of the worst years of 
the Cold War, with even the extreme example of a state-controlled Russian news outlet 
ominously threatening to “turn the United States into rubble of radio-active ashes” 
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(Birnbaum, 2015). Possibly, however, the most bothersome aspect of this rise in anti-
Americanism for some observers of international relations was that the hostility of the 
Kremlin was so strongly reflected by and supported within the general Russian public 
(Fisher, 2015). Various public opinion polls conducted in Russia showed the negative 
attitudes of the Russian public towards the United States reached a peak not seen since the 
collapse of the Soviet Union (Spinella, 2015). 
Michael Birnbaum, the Washington Post correspondent in Moscow, described the 
current rise of anti-Americanism in Russia in 2015:  
After a year in which furious rhetoric has been pumped across Russian 
airwaves, anger toward the United States is at its worst since opinion polls 
began tracking it. From ordinary street vendors all the way up to the 
Kremlin, a wave of anti-U.S. bile has swept the country, surpassing any time 
since the Stalin era .… The indignation peaked after the assassination of 
Kremlin critic Boris Nemtsov, as conspiracy theories started to swirl — just 
a few hours after he was killed — that his death was a CIA plot to discredit 
Russia. There are drives to exchange Western-branded clothing for Russia’s 
red, blue and white. Efforts to replace Coke with Russian-made soft drinks. 
Fury over U.S. sanctions. And a passionate, conspiracy-laden fascination 
with the methods that Washington is supposedly using to foment unrest in 
Ukraine and Russia” (Birnbaum, 2015).  
 
According to the survey data collected by the Levada Center, in January 2015, 81% 
of Russians held negative attitudes towards the United States (Levada Center, 2015a). Anti-
American attitudes in Russia reached the highest level since the beginning of surveying 
public opinion surveys in Russia in 1988 (see Figure 1).  
Even though public opinion in Russia turned against the United States on several 
occasions from 1995 to 2015, including spikes during and directly following the U.S. lead 
NATO military campaign in Servia in 1999, the Iraq invasion in 2003/2004 and the Russia-
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Georgia military conflict of 2008, never had the negative attitudes towards the U.S. reached 
such intensity.  
The number of respondents who said they had a “very negative” opinion about the 
United States tripled between 2013 and 2015 (see Figure 2). The rising hostility between 
the two nations also was reflected in the opinion of Americans about Russia. According to 
Gallup (Jones, 2015) in February 2015 Russia outranked North Korea as a country that 
Americans consider to be the United States’ greatest enemy today. The abrupt and 
unexpected negative shift in the relations between two countries was reflected in the 
dramatic changes in public opinion: as recently as 2012 only 2% of Americans perceived 
Russia to be primary enemy (see Figure 3). 
The sudden and persistent rise of anti-Americanism in Russia puzzled scholars of 
international relations and decision makers in the United States. Various scholars of anti-
Americanism proposed looking for the root of the phenomenon in the reaction of 
international publics to the actions and policies of the United States in the international 
arena (Nye, 2002, 2004; Chiozza, 2010). 
This logic seems to be grounded both in common sense and in public opinion data. 
For example, the decision of the Reagan administration in early 1980s to place mid-range 
tactical nuclear weapons in Western Europe was met with great animosity by the Western 
European publics (Nye, 2002). In a similar example, the seemingly unilateral actions taken 
by the United States in the War on Terror in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2003-2005 were 
extremely unpopular across the globe (Pew Research Center, 2003, 2007).  
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Figure 1. Levada Center. Distribution of answers to question “What is your general 
attitude toward the United States?” 1990-2015 
 
 
Figure 2. Levada Center. Distribution of answers to question “What is your general 
attitude toward the United States?” 2013-2015 
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Figure 3. Gallup. "What one country anywhere in the world do you consider to be United 
States’ greatest enemy today?" 2011 - 2015 
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The rise of anti-Americanism in Russia on both levels of mass public opinion and 
state actions and rhetoric, however, cannot be explained by the same logic. In 2008-2009 
relations between the two countries seemed to be cooperative and productive. In 2008, at 
the beginning of first term of President Barack Obama, his administration announced the 
“reset” of the relations between the two countries (Remnick, 2014), calling for a “fresh 
start” with a goal of “engaging the Russian government to pursue foreign policy goals of 
common interest – win-win outcomes – for the American and Russian people” (White 
House, Office of the Press Secretary, 2009). In 2009, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov symbolically pressed a “reset” button 
at a widely heralded press conference (Dougherty, 2009). One of the main architects and 
advocates of the reset policy, Michael McFaul, was appointed U.S. Ambassador to Russia 
in 2011.  
After the initial successes of the reset policy, however, cooperation between the 
two counties failed, and for reasons unclear to, and unexpected by, the U.S. government 
(Remnick, 2014). McFaul, who resigned as ambassador after the Olympic Games in Sochi 
in late 2014, commented on an unprecedented rise of anti-Americanism both in Russian 
policy and public opinion, calling relations between the United States and Russia as being, 
“at its lowest point since the post-Soviet period began, in 1991” (Remnick, 2014). 
Lev Gudkov, director of the Levada Center, attributed the unprecedented rise of 
anti-Americanism in Russia to a combination of state-propaganda, strong governmental 
control over mass media in the country and an anti-American predisposition within the 
Russian mindset (Vasiliev, 2015). Maria Lipman, a Moscow-based political analyst,   
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Figure 4. Timeline of U.S.-Russian relations (Plumer, 2013; Porter, 2008) 
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explained the success of state-run anti-American propaganda by pointing out pre-existing 
anti-American and anti-Western sentiments within the Russian public: “What the 
government knew was that it was very easy to cultivate anti-Western sentiments, and it was 
easy to consolidate Russian society around this propaganda” (Birnbaum, 2015). 
The goal of this dissertation was to conduct an empirical investigation of the 
phenomenon of anti-Americanism in early 21st century Russia. The purpose of this 
dissertation was to investigate the character, the sources, and the persistence of Russian 
attitudes towards the United States, with a focus on examining the role that Russian state-
controlled media play in shaping and fostering these attitudes. To achieve that goal, this 
dissertation included an empirical investigation of the specific features of popular 
perceptions of Russians about the United States, and an examination of various 
characteristics of the anti-American sentiments and the persistence of such attitudes among 
different socio-demographic groups within the Russian public.  
The study employed various methods of statistical analysis to survey data 
conducted in Russia by the Pew Research Center in 2012 and the Levada Center in 2011-
2015. In addition, the project included an investigation of the possible sources of popular 
anti-American views among Russians, focusing on the role of state-controlled Russian 
mass media in promoting and enhancing anti-American attitudes.  
The project was guided by the following questions: What aspects, policies, actions, 
or values associated with the United States are repellent or attractive to the Russian public? 
Which publics express negative or positive opinion, and what was the common ground for 
those who express such opinions? What are the sources of such high levels of negativity 
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towards the United States in Russia, and specifically what role do state-controlled mass 
media play in fostering those attitudes?   
This dissertation employed several theoretical frameworks that were developed in 
the field of anti-Americanism studies worldwide, including the “Dimensions of America” 
theory developed by Chiozza (2010), and Nye’s (1990, 2002, 2004) Soft Power theory. 
Those theories helped explain the phenomenon of Russian anti-Americanism, but also 
enabled the researcher to empirically test the persistence of attitudinal trends. An in-depth 
analysis of public opinion polling data covering various aspects of attitudes toward the 
United States allowed the researcher to examine the content and sources of these shifting 
attitudes.  
Investigation of the role of media in promoting anti-Americanism in Russia was 
especially important. Previous research showed that Russian state-controlled media, which 
were engaged in anti-Western and anti-American propaganda campaign, was the primary 
source of news and was mostly trusted and viewed as objective by the Russian public 
(Volkov & Goncharov, 2014). Incorporating an analysis of the influence of mass media in 
promoting and fostering anti-American attitudes enhanced the understanding of the 
relationship between mass media and public opinion in a country with an authoritarian 
media system where the state has strong control over editorial policies of mass media and 
uses the media coverage to foster popular support for its policies. The mass media element 
of the study is especially important since the role of mass media in promoting anti-
American attitudes in other regions of the world has been studied and proved to be 
significant (Nisbet & Myers, 2011).  
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Chapter 2  
Theoretical Framework and Methodology  
A number of definitions of anti-Americanism have been proposed by scholars. 
Most describe anti-Americanism as “some sort of opposition to America” (Chiozza, 2010), 
but there is little agreement as to what else defines anti-Americanism. As Crockatt (2003) 
explained, part of the reason for the difficulties producing an all-inclusive definition is 
because “like all essentially political terms, [anti-Americanism] proves difficult to define 
once you start peeling back the layers of meaning.” 
Chiozza (2010) suggested using a different approach focused on the study of anti-
Americanism “as the analysis of the popular sentiment towards the United States” (p. 36). 
In this approach, which is used in the dissertation, the term “popular” indicates opinions 
expressing beliefs about the United States as reported through public opinion polls. 
“Sentiment” implies that the views do not necessarily have to be a part of an encompassing 
ideology or mindset, but rather reflect the general mood people have towards the U.S. in a 
given moment.  
In order to measure such attitudes, well-designed public opinion polls are the most 
appropriate tool, since they, according to Verba, “offer the closest approximation to an 
unbiased representation of the public” (1996, p. 1). In his Dimensions of America theory, 
Chiozza suggested using Zaller’s (1992) and Alvarez and Brehm’s (2002) theories on mass 
public opinion as a theoretical framework for studying popular anti-Americanism. Public 
opinion theory provides an opportunity to analyze public opinion towards the United States 
as a cluster of issues (the multi-dimensional nature of public attitudes towards the United 
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States), and allows the researcher to test various theories that are presented in the literature 
on the nature of anti-American attitudes.  
In addition, combining public opinion polls on anti-American attitudes with media 
use/media credibility data allows for an exploration of the relations between attitudes and 
media coverage. This approach to investigating the peculiarities of public opinion towards 
the United States incorporates foreign public’s attitudes towards U.S. foreign policy with 
other dimensions of the United States and was based on the theoretical framework 
suggested by Chiozza (2010), and the Soft Power Theories conceptualized by Nye (1990, 
2002, 2004).  
A review of the literature on anti-Americanism brings to light two primary 
alternative views on the matter. The first can be called anti-Americanism as a syndrome 
and is represented in the works of such authors as Hollander (1995), Revel (2003) and 
Reuben and Reuben (2004). In this body of work, anti-Americanism is viewed as a 
pervasive cultural trait that “both frames the intellectual world view of ordinary people and 
dictates their basic political attitudes” (Chiozza, 2010). It is seen as a deeply rooted 
ideological construct that filters all opinion, attitudes and perceptions toward the United 
States, its policies and its people. As to the sources of anti-Americanism under this theory, 
scholars suggest explanations ranging from culture to ideology to specific relationships 
between certain countries and the United States. 
In this interpretation of the phenomenon, the foundation of anti-Americanism is not 
based on the reality of the United States and its foreign policy, but rather on the perception 
of that reality by foreign publics. As Hollander (1995) explained, “The concept of anti-
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Americanism implies more than a critical disposition: it refers to critiques which are less 
than fully rational and not necessarily well founded. It usually alludes to a predisposition, 
a free-floating hostility or aversion that feeds on sources besides the discernable short-
comings of the United States” (1995, p. 7).  
 
Dimensions of America theory  
According to Chiozza (2010), the second theoretical approach to anti-Americanism 
views the phenomenon as an open cognitive structure that is the result of the “aggregation 
of considerations, predispositions and information.”  An example of this open cognitive 
structure approach is the so-called “Dimensions of America” theory (Chiozza, 2010). 
According to Chiozza, popular anti-Americanism is mostly benign and shallow, and is far 
from being a prejudice or a deeply-integrated ideological opposition. Analysis of public 
opinion data from around the globe provided by Pew Research Center demonstrated that 
particular policy changes and actions by the United States can produce a shift between 
positive and negative attitudes and create a wave of dissatisfaction with the United States 
among foreign publics, but the data also shows that those negative trends are context-driven 
and tend to reverse with time. 
Chiozza (2010) acknowledged that “a deep-seated ideological opposition to the 
United States certainly exists…. But it is usually the aberration of a minority of people in 
few quarters of the world” (p. 4). This optimistic view, according to Chiozza, is explained 
by the fact that foreign publics form their opinion of the United States based on more than 
one aspect of America. Thus, the temporary disappointment some foreign publics may have 
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due to the actions of the United States (such as, for example, a unilateral foreign policy) 
seen periodically in the public opinion polls worldwide is balanced by the foreign public’s 
positive views of other things about the United States, such as American popular culture, 
science and technology, and business initiatives. As Chiozza (2010) explained, the 
Dimensions of America theory “provides a theoretical account – grounded in a theory of 
public opinion – of the individual level processes that lead to the articulation of negative 
opinion of the United States in a specific political and cultural locale” (p. 5).  
This approach comes from the theoretical perspective that points to the multi-
faceted nature of anti-Americanism. Other examples of this approach include Katzenstein 
and Keohane’s typology of anti-Americanism (2007), and Meunier’s (2007), as well as 
Bow’s, Katzenstein’s and Santa-Cruz’s (2007) attempts to identify types of anti-
Americanism world-wide. These studies are similar to the extent that they reject the view 
that anti-Americanism is a uniform opposition to the United States. 
Several studies of anti-Americanism in Russia followed a similar approach to the 
explanation of the phenomenon. Shlapentokh (2001; 2007, 2011), for example, argued 
against presenting anti-Americanism in modern Russia as a phenomenon deeply rooted in 
the Russian mentality. Rather, he suggested that the high levels of anti-American 
sentiments among Russians were superficial, and stimulated by the anti-American stand of 
the Russian elites and the resulting state-sponsored propaganda. According to Shlapentokh, 
“anti-Americanism in Russia, as well as in most other countries, does not come from below, 
from general populations, but rather from above, from the elites. It is the elite class, through 
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its ability to control and manipulate the media, education and literature, that has the power 
to either foster or stifle xenophobia” (Shlapentokh, 2001, p. 878).  
Cole (2006) attributed the global rise of anti-American sentiments not to the 
intrinsic anti-American biases of the foreign publics, but to American actions in the 
international arena. Unilateral actions of the United States in foreign affairs, according to 
Cole, fuel global anti-Americanism.   
The Dimensions of America theory provided both the overarching theoretical 
framework and methodology to examine the popular anti-Americanism in Russia. This 
theory, together with Nye’s Soft Power theory (1990, 2004), guided an empirical 
investigation of the phenomenon of anti-Americanism in modern Russia, with the focus on 
the dimensions of Anti-Americanism in Russia, profiles of anti-American opinion, and the 
role of mass media in shaping public attitudes and opinions about the U.S.     
In order to conduct an in-depth analysis of the attitudes of the Russian public 
towards the United States, it is imperative to go beyond simply summarizing the positive 
or negative attitudes. Questions must be considered beyond those of the survey. What was 
it about the United States that made 81% of the Russian public in 2015 express negative 
attitudes towards the country? What was it about the behavior, culture or values of the 
United States that repelled the Russian public? And, on the other hand, what were the 
dimensions of the United States that even in the hostile environment that existed between 
the two countries still looked appealing to the Russian public?  
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Soft power thesis  
The concept of soft power was developed in the early 1990s by Nye (1990, 2004), 
a theorist of international relations and a U.S. diplomat. He defined power as the ability to 
get outcomes one wants, or more specifically the ability to influence the behavior of others 
to get the desired outcome. In a geopolitical context, a country’s power rests in its ability 
to make others act in accordance with its preferences. This power comes from two sources: 
hard power (military and economic might), and soft power (getting other countries and 
groups to want to achieve the same outcomes through other means). Thus, Nye defined soft 
power as the ability to get the desired outcome through attraction rather than coercion or 
payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideas and 
policies, and rests in its ability to influence preferences of others. Assets such as attractive 
values, culture, institutions and policies make a country’s foreign policy seem more 
legitimate, and carrying moral authority. As Nye stated, if a leader represents values that 
others want to follow, it will cost less to lead.  
The soft power of a country rests primarily of three resources: its culture (aspects 
attractive to others), its political values (what the country lives up to at home and abroad) 
and its foreign policy (when it is seen as legitimate and having moral authority). Various 
sources help produce soft power, such as governmental policies at home and abroad. Some 
of those sources are outside governmental control, such as popular culture and various non-
governmental organizations that act independently. The attractiveness of the culture, values 
and the institutions of the United States, according to Nye, enhances the ability of the 
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United States to shape preferences of foreign publics and helps lower the level of negative 
attitudes towards the U.S.   
According to Nye, the United States has a deep reservoir of soft power, which 
enhances its ability for leadership. Testing of the soft power thesis on global public opinion 
polling data by Chiozza (2010) has been partially supported empirically. Indeed, there were 
various traits of the U.S. that foreign publics admire across the globe: American popular 
culture, business practices, technological achievements, and basic democratic values were 
perceived positively by majority of foreign publics. However, Chiozza stated that on the 
micro level, where popular attitudes about the United States are formed, “soft power is 
hardly a fungible political resource. Approval of U.S. cultural norms and values does not 
necessarily ameliorate popular views about U.S. diplomatic and international behavior” (p. 
5).  
This dissertation was designed to put both the Dimensions of American theory and 
the Soft Power theory to the test by conducting statistical analysis of the Pew Global 
Attitudes survey that was conducted in Russia in 2012. The following set of questions 
focused on respondents’ attitudes towards various aspects of the United States were used 
in the statistical analysis:  
- Attitudes towards the U.S; 
- Attitudes towards the American people; 
- Attitudes towards U.S. democracy; 
- Attitudes towards U.S. businesses practices;  
- Attitudes towards American popular culture;  
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- Attitudes towards U.S. science and technology; 
- Attitudes towards the spread of U.S. customs in Russia 
The detailed description of the Pew survey, as well as descriptions and explanations 
of the statistical methods of analysis are provided in the Results chapter of this dissertation.   
 
Profiles of anti-American opinion in Russia  
In order to investigate and understand the peculiarities of the anti-American 
sentiments in Russia, it is important to analyze the individual profiles of two groups of 
respondents: the groups that we can call “anti-American,” i.e. those that express overall 
negative views about the United States, and the “pro-Americans,” those who express 
favorable opinion about the United States. Looking into individual characteristics of 
respondents, according to Chiozza, “allow[s] to show how anti-American sentiments are 
anchored in specific personal and political contexts” (2010, p. 6). 
In Chiozza’s (2010) research on popular anti-Americanism world-wide, none of the 
specific factors gained pre-eminence at the aggregate levels, and no single overarching 
demographic or attitudinal factor influencing the respondents position about the United 
States was found. This research project incorporated data analysis that allowed the 
identification of socio-demographic factors and attitudes towards foreign and domestic 
affairs that were associated with pro- or anti-American views.  
Taking into consideration a tendency among some experts and academics to assume 
that Russian anti-Americanism is nothing more than a continuation of the old Soviet anti-
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American mentality, it was especially interesting to test the relationship between age and 
the attitudes towards the United States.  
The methodology of the data analysis was partly based on Chiozza’s (2010) 
research on global anti-Americanism, but incorporated additional methods of statistical 
analysis. In order to investigate peculiarities of public attitudes held by the Russian public 
towards various aspects of the United States, this analysis incorporated various statistical 
methods aimed at detecting structural patterns and evaluating relationships between 
variables. The statistical methods included factor analysis, regression modeling, and cluster 
analysis, and use of descriptive statistics.   
 
Sources of Anti-Americanism in Russia: the influence of mass media  
In the introduction to his Dimensions of America theory, Chiozza (2010) stressed 
that popular views about the United States are a combination of considerations, 
predispositions and information available to the foreign publics. Based on Zaller’s (1992) 
theory of public opinion, this approach interprets anti-Americanism as a “mental construct 
and a result of aggregation of considerations, cues, bits of information, [and] emotions” 
(Chiozza, 2010, p. 37).  
Both definitions stressed that the foreign publics are formulating their opinion about 
the United States based on the information immediately available to them, in other words 
on the bits and pieces of knowledge and interpretations they have stored in their minds. 
Previous research on public opinion, foreign policy and mass media demonstrated that the 
general public usually gets its information about foreign affairs from mass media (Entman, 
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2003, 2004, 2008). Thus, various elite groups who have an influence on how mass media 
outlets cover foreign issues have an influence on the popular views about those issues.   
The relationship between public opinion on foreign policy, mass media coverage 
and elites was well explained by Entman’s Cascading Activation Model, an attempt, on a 
theoretical level, to connect policy, mass media and public opinion in a single model. The 
original framework was developed by Entman to explain the spread and dominance of 
different framings of U.S. foreign policy in American media. In the book “Projections of 
Power” (2004), Entman conceptualized the model to explain how “framing fighting” was 
conducted between various actors and levels, and who was likely to win the battle of 
framing and why, based on various examples from American foreign policy, domestic 
media coverage and public opinion.  
Entman’s model consisted of a hierarchy of networks through which mental 
associations on foreign policy activate and spread. It traced the diffusion of frames from 
the U.S. president through networks of elites outside of the administration who also serve 
as media sources. Next, he looked at the diffusion of frames as they moved through the 
networks of journalists and media organizations, both within and across them. Then to the 
textual and visual network of connected and repeated keywords, themes and visual images. 
And, finally, to the network of associations activated within audiences. The model was not 
strictly a top-bottom approach, since it took into consideration how self-reinforcing 
feedback from all levels frequently influenced framing. It also included four factors that 
influence the success of framing, including motivations of various actors and cultural 
congruence, elite power and elite strategy.  
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As Entman described it, in framing foreign policy in the United States the White 
House is usually the most powerful player. Whatever the U.S. president does or says 
becomes news instantly. Journalists look to the White House as a major (and sometimes 
the most influential) source of news on foreign policy. The presidential press corps makes 
it less important to seek attention of the media, since both official and off-the-record 
messages from the White House are valued by the news media. According to Entman, 
White House framing efforts will be effective in manipulating both media coverage and 
public opinion if the framing corresponds to widely spread pre-existing schemata. Entman 
listed several examples from U.S. foreign policy, such as the shooting down of the Korean 
airplane by the Soviets in 1983 and the decision of the Bush Administration to engage in a 
military operation in Afghanistan after 9/11, as events where the framing by the White 
House was successful because it corresponded so well with pre-existing schemas in the 
minds of both journalists and the American public.  
Due to the nature of foreign affairs and international events (that the general public 
is not directly engaged in or closely following various policy implementation), the 
influence of the elites on the framing of foreign affairs issues in popular opinion is strong, 
even in countries where mass media enjoy a far greater degree of freedom and autonomy 
than their Russian counterparts. In Russia, where most popular mass media outlets are 
under state control, the authorities have the upper hand in framing political issues for the 
general public.  
As discussed in details in the chapter on the Russian political-media system, the 
media landscape in Russian in 2015 was heavily dominated by the state-controlled media 
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outlets. As the Freedom House Freedom of the Press 2014 report indicated, the Russian 
authorities set the editorial policies for the broadcasting outlets and the majority of print 
outlets, and used the state-controlled mass media outlets as vehicles for propaganda:  
The government sets editorial policy at state-run television stations, which 
dominate the media sector. The country’s more than 400 daily newspapers 
offer content for a wide range of interests but rarely challenge the Kremlin 
line on important issues such as corruption or ongoing tensions in the North 
Caucasus. Meaningful political debate is mostly limited to weekly 
magazines, news websites, some radio programs, and a handful of 
newspapers such as Novaya Gazeta or Vedomosti, all of which are aimed 
at urban, educated, and relatively well-off Russians. Although these 
independent outlets are tolerated to some extent, the main national news 
agenda is firmly controlled by the Kremlin (Freedom House, 2014). 
 
The Reporters Without Borders report placed Russia near the bottom of its 2015 
World Press Freedom Index, positioning it at #152 out of 180 countries. The Index outlines 
the extent of governmental control over mass media content in Russia: “[In 2014] While 
Russia’s leading TV channels continue to inundate viewers with propaganda, the Ukrainian 
crisis led to an increase in pressure on independent media, with a string of draconian laws, 
website blocking and leading independent news outlets either being brought under control 
or throttled out of existence. The climate has become very oppressive for those who 
question the new patriotic and neo-conservative discourse…” (Reporters Without Borders, 
2015).  
Kratasyuk (2006) noted additional distinctive features of the Russian media 
landscape, (i.e. the popularity and role of television). She stated that television in Russian 
had an “integral, out-look forming role… vital for community” (Kratasyuk, 2006, p. 34). 
She also argued that in the context of the high degree of social uncertainty that Russian 
society was experiencing after the collapse of the Soviet Union, broadcast media play an 
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integral role in the construction of society and nation-building, creating national identity 
and transmitting meanings and interpretations imposed by dominant elites. During the 
Putin era, according to Kratasyuk, the state-run mass media were actively working on the 
recreation of a pan-Russian identity centered in the idea of a single strong state:  
Television is used in order to search for and construct the values ‘that unite 
all’. It is a ‘monolithic’ system of historical norms and political preferences, 
sanctioned by the state.… The absence of public opinion shaping 
mechanisms, combined with an acutely felt desire for self-identification, for 
the creation of an ‘image of Russia’ (i.e. search for identity) leads to the 
development, whereby simultaneous watching of TV programmers 
becomes, for the majority of Russians, the only mechanism holding society 
together (Kratasyuk, 2006, p. 37-38). 
 
Kratasyuk argued that experience with the “monolithic” and homogeneous Soviet 
mass media, with all its ideological zeal, has made the Russian audience omnivorous and 
manipulable. In addition, she described the “primitive” and “simplistic” means of 
influencing the audience that are used by state-run television networks in Russia, and 
explained the use of such techniques by the media via Soviet-inherited traditions and 
mentality. She postulated there is a tendency among Russian journalists and editors (as 
there is among all people) to follow previously established patterns of behavior within their 
profession. These legacy patterns, established under the Soviet system, Kratasyuk argued, 
continue to frame the approach to journalism in post-Soviet Russia.  
In addition, the pubic follows its own set of previously established patterns (i.e. 
high degree of trust for information presented by the media and official sources even if it 
does not correspond with their own life experience). Kratasyuk argued that the use of crude 
propaganda by the state-run TV channels can be explained by the combination of a low-
level of critical thinking within the audience, the public’s desire to get simple and 
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understandable messages from mass media and by the role of state-run mass media in the 
creation of a national identity built around the notion of a strong state.               
Various studies and reports focused on the content of news relating to the United 
States in state-controlled mass media demonstrated the rise of the anti-American coverage 
by the state-controlled mass media outlets. Led Guvkov, the director of the Levada Center, 
told the Washington Post in an interview: “This [state-controlled mass media] anti-Western 
propaganda radically changed the atmosphere in the society (Birnbaum, 2015).”  
According to the Levada Center, 93% of respondents in a nation-wide 
representative poll in 2014 said that television news was their number one source of 
domestic and foreign news (Volkov & Goncharov, 2014).  
According to the same survey, almost half of all Russians used only one 
information source, and 85% watched only television. Television news broadcasts that the 
surveyed Russians watched were primarily from three state-controlled channels: “1st”, 
“Russia-1” and “NTV”. The combined audience of the relatively independent TV stations, 
such as “Ren-TV”, Euronews and “TVRain" did not exceed 17-18% (Volkov & 
Goncharov, 2014). 
Most Russians trusted television, according to the March 2014 Levada report on 
media consumption. Not everyone who watched television news believed in ITS 
objectivity, but around 50% nationwide and 65% of respondents in Moscow trusted it 
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Figure 5. Levada Center. Distribution of answers to the question “How do you usually 
get most of your news about events in the country and in the world?” March 2014 
 
Figure 6. Levada Center. Distribution of answers to the question “Which sources of 
information do you trust most of all in coverage of domestic and foreign news?” March 
2014 
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nonetheless. Doubts about the objectivity of the television news, according to Levada, did 
not affect the consumption: it was still the main source of information for those who trusted 
TV (for 92% in this group), and for those who did not trust it (88% respectively). 
Hypothesis  
As stated above, state-run mass media outlets in Russia are under complete 
governmental control, and state-controlled television channels are the main source of 
information for the majority of Russians. Based on this information, this dissertation tested 
the following set of hypotheses about the relations between media use/trust and attitudes 
towards the United States: 
Hypothesis 1A: “Use of state-controlled mass media outlets as the primary source 
of news among the Russian public was associated with higher levels of negative attitudes 
towards the United States.”  
Hypothesis 1B: “Use of independent mass media outlets as the primary source of 
news among the Russian public was associated with lower levels of negative attitudes 
towards the United States.”  
Hypothesis 2: “Use of television as a primary source of news among the Russian 
public was associated with higher levels of negative attitudes towards the United States.”  
Hypothesis 3: “Trust for mass media outlets in their coverage of domestic and 
foreign news was associated with the higher levels of negative attitudes towards the United 
States.”  
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These hypotheses were tested with data provided by the Levada Center based on 
the following questions that have been repeatedly included into Levada surveys in Russia 
in 2011-2015:  
- What is your main news source about the events in the country? (The answers 
included Russian state-controlled TV stations, Russian independent TV 
stations, Internet, foreign news sources, Russian state-controlled newspapers, 
Russian independent newspapers, radio, friends/family/colleagues) 
- What is your general attitude toward the United States? (The answers include 
very positive, mostly positive, mostly negative and very negative)    
- To what extent do you trust mass media? (Trust completely, mostly trust, 
mostly distrust, distrust completely). 
 
Data sources: Pew and Levada datasets  
Unfortunately, a single and all-inclusive database of public opinion polls conducted 
in Russia in 2011-2015 that would include all the questions needed for a comprehensive 
examination of popular attitudes towards the United States did not exist.  
Instead, this research incorporated data analysis using two separate sources of 
public opinion polls from the Pew Research Center and the Levada Center (Russia).  The 
author believes that despite the lack of an all-inclusive dataset, the data available provided 
ample insight into the topic of in this dissertation.  
The Pew Research Center, a non-partisan think-tank based in Washington, D.C., 
annually conducts a series of international public opinion polls as a part of the “Pew Global 
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Attitudes Project” (Pew Research Center, 2012). The surveys have been conducted on a 
regular basis since 2002, and are administered in a number of countries, including Russia. 
Access to the yearly database is free and open to public, and the SPSS files are available 
for download from the Pew Research Center website. The database includes a variety of 
questions, as well as, detailed demographic information.  
The dataset from the 2012 survey wave was chosen for analysis because it was the 
only recent survey that allows comparison with research conducted by Chiozza (2010). 
Both Pew surveys included a number of questions on the different aspects of public 
attitudes towards the U.S., its foreign policy, actions, culture, and other aspects. 
Even though public opinion polls showed that the peak of anti-American attitudes 
in Russia was reached in 2013-2014 (see Levada data presented in the introduction), multi-
faceted and in-depth analysis of anti-American attitudes in Russia in 2012 allowed for an 
investigation of the preconditions within public mass opinion that led to an explosion of 
negativity towards the United States.  
The Pew Research Center’s report “Russians Back Protests, Political Freedoms 
And Putin, Too” provided details on the methodology used in the survey conducted in 
Russia in 2012:   
The survey in Russia is part of the larger Spring 2012 Pew Global Attitudes 
survey conducted in 21 countries under the direction of Princeton Survey 
Research Associates International.  
Results for the survey in Russia are based on 1,000 face-to-face interviews 
conducted March 19 to April 4, 2012. The survey is representative of the 
country’s adult population. It uses a multi-stage cluster sample stratified by 
Russia’s eight regions and proportional to population size, excluding a few 
remote areas in the northern and eastern parts of the country and Chechnya. 
All interviews were conducted in Russian.  
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The margin of sampling error is ±3.6 percentage points. For the results 
based on the full sample, one can say with 95% confidence that the error 
attributable to sampling and other random effects is plus or minus the 
margin of error. In addition to sampling error, one should bear in mind that 
question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can 
introduce error or bias into the findings of opinion polls (Pew, 2012). 
 
The Levada Center, headquartered in Moscow, is one of Russia’s largest and 
oldest independent research centers. The Levada Center has been monitoring public 
opinion in Russia on a number of topics since 1988. The Center regularly conducts nation-
wide non-state funded representative surveys and publishes the surveys on its website. 
Survey results from the Levada Center are the most longitudinal study of Russian public 
opinion about the United States, covering the past 27 years.  
The details of the survey methodology used by the Levada Center can be found on 
its website. Apart from monitoring changes in the attitudes towards the United States, the 
Levada Center, throughout the years, has asked the Russian public a number of other 
questions related to the U.S. image, leadership and policies, as well as questions about 
relations between the two countries. In addition to the data on attitudes towards the United 
States, other questions included in Levada surveys were used in this dissertation, 
specifically questions on mass media use, mass media credibility and the socio-
demographic information about the respondents.    
The author has a professional relationship with the Levada Center staff though her 
long-term work for the Independent Institute for Socio-Economic and Political Studies 
(Minsk, Belarus). Researchers from the Levada Center agreed to provide survey data for 
this dissertation. This data analysis allowed for testing of hypothesis about relations 
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between exposure and trust of state-controlled mass media and rising anti-Americanism in 
Russia.  
Due to ownership of the database the researcher was unable to work with the data 
personally, but used the cross-tabs that were provided by researchers from the Levada 
Center. Lack of complete control of the data is not ideal, but given the fact that no other 
source of the necessary data existed, the author felt it was appropriate to proceed with the 
research in this manner given the goals of the project.  Working with the Levada Center 
provided a unique access to survey data collected in Russia on specific questions related to 
both anti-American attitudes and media use/credibility. The Levada Center is the only 
research organization that was conducting polls on those two topics in Russia, and has an 
internationally-recognized reputation of high academic integrity.  
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Chapter 3  
Anti-Americanism in Russia: Historical Framework   
In order to discuss the phenomenon of anti-Americanism in Russia during Putin’s 
third presidential term, it is imperative to trace changes in public attitudes towards the 
United States from the yearly Soviet years to collapse of the Soviet Union, and from the 
birth on the new Russian state to the latest developments in the Russian Federation in 
2010s. Most experts who have studied public opinion and anti-Americanism in Russia have 
argued that at least to some extent the roots of 2015 negativity towards United States can 
be  traced back to the Soviet Union and the dramatic developments of 1990s (Shiraev and 
Zubok, 2000; Shlapentokh, 1988; 2001; 2011; Trilupaityte, 2008).   
While attitudes towards the United States held by the Russian people in the 1990s 
and the early 2000s were systematically traced by the Levada Center, Gallup and other 
organizations through public opinion polling, there is no reliable survey data from the 
Soviet Union prior to 1989. The communist party claimed it expressed the voice and 
mindset of the people. This assumption was expressed as the “designated majority.” There 
was, therefore, no need to study actual attitudes of the people through surveys 
(Gasparishvili, 1990).  
Some scholars (Gasparishvili, 1990) have argued that the term “public opinion” 
was not even applicable as a concept in the Soviet Union. The phenomenon of public 
opinion, they reason, can only exist in a democratic society. According to this logic, since 
the freedom of expression was severely limited in the Soviet Union, there was no such 
phenomenon as public opinion in its contemporary understanding.  
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Regardless of the academic debate as to the proper terminology, the Soviet people 
did indeed hold opinions about the United States and Americans. These attitudes were 
expressed outside the scope of opinion surveys through folklore and samizdat (the 
clandestine publishing and copying of materials that were banned by the Soviet state), and 
were reflected in the popular youth counter-culture via music, art and other visual 
expression. The views of the Soviet people were demonstrated publicly through their 
participation in state-sponsored rallies, as well as “kitchen talks” in which hushed, 
forbidden debates were muffled by the sound of running faucets to insure privacy of 
conversations. These attitudes were studied by various scholars using historical method, 
interviews, textual analysis and various other techniques.   
 
Russia and the United States: from the Russian Empire to World War II  
A brief overview of the history of the attitudes of the Soviet (and later Russian) 
people towards the United States is not only a story of anti-Americanism, but also a story 
of a complicated relationship between two nations that resented, feared, fascinated, and 
even admired each other. For most of the 20th century and through the years of the Cold 
War, the Soviet and Russian people had strong feelings towards the United States. Attitudes 
fluctuated between admiration and resentment, love and hatred, and sometimes all of those 
complex and conflicting emotions were experienced simultaneously.   
Such an important but ambiguous relationship with a strong Western nation was 
not the first such encounter in Russian history. Shiraev and Zubok (2000) noted that Russia 
throughout its history had complicated and ambivalent views about the West. Since the 
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time of tsars, Russian elites struggled to define the place and role of their country in the 
context of Eastern or Western cultures. Determining the best way to move the country 
forward without losing its cultural identity split the Russian elites into two camps: the so-
called Westernizers and the Slavophiles. According to Shlapentokh (1988), the struggle 
between the Westernizers, who viewed Russia as a part of the Western civilization and 
regarded the West as a model for Russia, and the Slavophiles, who praised Russian 
exceptionalism, has been one of the defining factors in Russian history.  
As Shiraev and Zubok (2000) explained, both camps shared an ambiguous response 
towards the West. This simultaneous admiration and attraction to the Western way of life 
and its culture was juxtaposed with resentment to everything Western throughout the 
Russian history. In different periods of Russian history, according to Shlapentokh (1988), 
Russia chose one or more Western countries to compare itself against. During the 18th and 
19th centuries Russia compared itself to various Western nations including England, 
France, Germany and the Netherlands. Russian elites singled out these countries as 
examples of Western modernization and progress. They were imitated and accepted by 
some Russians while rejected by others.   
Shlapentokh (1988) noted that after the Second Word War, the United States 
became the country against which the Soviet people and the Soviet authorities measured 
themselves. The United States “captured the imagination of the Soviet people and that has 
become the symbol of the West in the Soviet mind.... the images of the United States and 
the attitudes towards this country in the U.S.S.R. represent the stance of the Soviet people 
toward the West in general (p. 159).” (Shlapentokh, 1988, p. 158-159).”  
 
35 
In the 55 years of Soviet history that followed, the image of the United States in the 
Soviet mind fluctuated significantly. Shlapentokh (1988) noted that the pendulum of public 
attitudes of the Soviet people has gone from highly positive to highly negative within one 
generation. Such swings in public attitudes, according to the author, depended on internal 
factors, such as social, political and economic developments within the Soviet Union. Each 
major phase of the political development of the Soviet Union (and the Russian Federation 
after the collapse of the U.S.S.R.) created its own dominant image of the United States. 
Those images were influenced to some extent by the relations between two countries and 
the developments within American society, but even more so they were shaped by social 
and political trends in the Soviet Union.    
Shlapentokh (1988) pointed out that in the period from the birth of the Soviet Union 
until the death of Joseph Stalin (with a brief exception during World War II) the official 
anti-American propaganda-driven image of the United States prevailed among the Soviet 
people. Anti-Western hysteria reached its peak in the late 1930s during Stalin’s infamous 
purges, when a positive reference about the U.S., England, France or other Western country 
made in a private conversation could lead to arrest, imprisonment and even a death sentence 
for espionage or being considered a “foreign provocateur” (Shlapentokh, 1988).  
Shiraev and Zubok (2000) described the peculiarities of the image of the United 
States that was presented to the Soviet public by the government and state-controlled mass 
media during that time. Traditions of the communist ideology viewed societal development 
as a class struggle between progressive elements and the proletariat vs. the capitalist 
exploiters. Such ideological views prevented the Soviet state from portraying all of the 
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United States as the enemy. Instead, according to the Soviet propaganda, the innocent 
citizens of the U.S. were struggling under the exploitation of capitalists. The enemy in the 
Soviet press and official statements was not the American people, but the CIA, right-wing 
politicians, Wall Street, the Pentagon and others. Such coverage produced an interesting 
effect on the perception of the U.S. by the Soviet people: “for the Russian individuals, the 
enemy was not all ‘Americans’, but specific groups and manipulated by ‘bad’ Americans” 
(Shiraev and Zubok, 2000, p. 14). 
During the Second World War, the intensity of anti-American propaganda faded 
slightly (Shiraev and Zubok, 2000). Soviet propaganda acknowledged the role of the 
United States as an ally against Nazi Germany and became slightly more neutral in its 
coverage. As for the people of the Soviet Union, the role of Americans in defeating 
Germany, and the lend-lease program, which provided aid for the Soviet Union, 
contributed to the public view of the U.S. as a strong and wealthy country. 
 
The Cold War: 1949 - 1985 
After the end of the war, the Soviet Union used its position as an allied victor to 
extend its sphere of influence in Central and Eastern Europe and the Far East. By the end 
of 1940s, according to Shiraev and Zubok, Stalin began to see the United States as the main 
adversary of the Soviet Union. The Soviet propaganda machine was restructured to create 
the image of the U.S. as the main ideological enemy: “Stalin began to promote a two-fold 
image of America. It was an image of a great and powerful nation that was ruled by short 
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sighted billionaires from Wall Street; it was the power that could not match its economic 
might by the valor on the battlefield” (Shiraev and Zubok, 2000, p. 11).   
The death of Joseph Stalin and the subsequent “Thaw” initiated by Nikita 
Khrushchev brought tremendous changes to the Soviet Union. The policies of de-
Stalinization, lessening of repression and censorship, economic reforms, and the new 
doctrine of peaceful co-existence with other countries transformed Soviet society and had 
an effect on the image of the U.S. and the West (Shlapentokh, 1988).  
The prominence of the United States in the mindset of the Soviet leadership was 
demonstrated by the slogan that Nikita Khrushchev proposed to the Soviet people: “[to] 
Catch up to and surpass America.” Shiraev and Zubok (2000) noted that Khrushchev’s 
position led to a fundamental change in the perceptions of the world by an average Soviet 
citizen: for the first time since the birth of the Soviet state, the communist system was 
allowed to be compared with the capitalist system on an ideological level. As a result, the 
Soviet people became used to comparing their lives with standards of living in the U.S.  
Gorbachev and Mlynar (2013) pointed out that this constant comparison eventually 
undermined the faith of the Soviet people in their underlying economic and political 
system.  
Gradual democratization of Soviet society and changes on the official ideological 
level led to a transformation of the image of the United States in the minds of the Soviet 
people. While the nuclear arms race and the ideological confrontation between the 
communist and the capitalist systems became the main topics in relations between the two 
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countries, official anti-American propaganda became significantly less effective in 
promoting a negative image of the U.S.  
Also following World War II, the Soviet people were exposed to some extent to 
American culture as the Soviet government allowed the dissemination of various books by 
American authors and the screening of popular American movies. Some Soviet people 
were exposed to additional alternative sources of information about the United States, such 
as British BBC and American Radio Liberty and the Voice of America. These factors, 
combined with the repeated usage stereotypes (such as American imperialism, racial 
problems and labor unrest) by the Soviet mass media, led to the relative ineffectiveness of 
the Soviet anti-American propaganda.  
Shlapentokh (1988) explained that Soviet elites and intelligentsia in the 1960s 
formed a very different image of the United States and the West. The levels of 
technological and scientific progress, combined with impressive economic development in 
the U.S., were attributed to the democratic system. Such events as the moon landing made 
a strong impression on the Soviet public. While the official state propaganda continued to 
cover social problems in the U.S., the well-educated Soviet citizens were charmed and even 
inspired by the idea of America. In addition, the young generation born after the war (the 
so-called “shestidesyatniki”) were forming their own counter-culture, and were fascinated 
with everything American, from jazz music to fashion.   
The 1970s brought yet another swing of the pendulum. Under Leonid Brezhnev’s 
leadership, the somewhat positive image of the United States was replaced in the minds of 
both Soviet intellectuals and the general public with “mostly negative pictures” 
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(Shlapentokh, 1988). Official anti-American propaganda changed gears and incorporated 
some of elements of the Russophile ideology that holds a sense of the moral superiority of 
the Russian culture and the Russian people over anything Western.  
This possibly was seen most clearly during the period known as détente (1969-
1979). During this time the Soviet anti-American propaganda focused heavily on the 
superiority of Soviet culture, way of life and society over American. Shlapentokh (1988) 
suggested the Soviet leadership realized it was it is impossible for the U.S.S.R. to catch up 
with the United States economically or technologically. This inferiority was unsettling for 
the Kremlin, as well as many Soviet intellectuals, and their response was to insist on the 
moral and cultural superiority of the U.S.S.R.    
 
Perestroika and the Collapse of the U.S.S.R.: infatuation with the West and the U.S.  
In 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev assumed the reins of power in the Soviet Union. 
Gorbachev’s election had a profound impact on the future of the Soviet Union: it led to the 
end of the Cold War, decimation of the Warsaw Pact, the gradual democratization of 
Eastern Europe, the eventual dismantling of U.S.S.R. and the rise of the new Russian state. 
Gorbachev, who hoped to restart the crumbling Soviet economy and revitalize the Soviet 
society, initiated the policies of Glasnost (openness and democratization of the public 
sphere) and Perestroika (limited market reforms). He also dramatically changed Soviet 
foreign policy, introducing the “New Thinking” policies focused on improving relations 
and boosting trade with the United States and Western Europe.  
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In next five years, Gorbachev normalized relations with the United States and other 
Western European countries, withdrew Soviet troops from Afghanistan, abandoned the 
Brezhnev doctrine, the goal of an ever-expanding sphere of influence, while granting 
Eastern European countries a right to self-determination.  
The Soviet Bloc, those independent but heavily influenced border nations, started 
to crumble in 1989 when Polish elections led to creation of a non-communist government. 
Soon other Warsaw Pact countries followed her lead, and with Gorbachev’s refusal to use 
military force to stop them, the “Block” was no more. On November 9, 1989, the end of an 
empire came as East and West Germans, artificially divided as two nations by Soviet might, 
tore down the Berlin Wall.   
 Gorbachev’s foreign policy was widely viewed by the public as a success. His 
domestic policies, however, were increasingly unpopular with the Soviet people. The 
failure of Gorbachev’s attempts to reform the socialistic economy led to rapidly worsening 
economic and social conditions. According to Shiraev and Zubok (2000), the Soviet people 
for the first time in almost 70 years started to blame the government and the old Communist 
system.  
In addition to worsening economic conditions, democratization policies of the 
Gorbachev’s government led to the crumbling of centralized control in the Soviet Union 
and increasing demands of other Soviet republics for independence. In the summer of 1991, 
a group of high-level Soviet hard-liners attempted a coup against Gorbachev, demanding 
return to the old Soviet ways. The coup failed when both the Army and the Soviet people 
took the side of Boris Yeltsin, the new leader of the Russian state, who supported 
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democratic reforms. After the coup, Boris Yeltsin emerged as the most powerful politician 
in Russia. The following December, the U.S.S.R. was officially dissolved into 15 
independent republics, and Gorbachev resigned. 
The changes initiated by Gorbachev had a profound impact on Soviet society and 
on people’s attitudes towards the West and the United States. The policies of Glasnost were 
aimed at easing strict control of the state over the public sphere and public life. The 
relationship between the U.S.S.R. and the United States was changing dramatically. Zubok 
and Shiraev (2000) called it an “euphoric stage of Soviet-American relations that lasted 
almost 5 years” (p. 144). Official anti-American propaganda was winding down as 
Gorbachev expanded relations with Western leaders. The slowing down of the nuclear arms 
race, and personal relations with U.S. President Ronald Reagan and other Western leaders, 
greatly contributed to the change in perceptions of the United States as the main ideological 
enemy. At the time, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and President Reagan 
became the most popular foreign politicians in the Soviet Union. During his visit to 
Moscow in 1988, President Reagan made a statement that would have been impossible 
several years earlier. Standing on the Red Square, surrounded by a crowd of enthusiastic 
and welcoming Soviet citizens, he declared that the concept of “Evil Empire” belonged to 
another era (Meisler, 1988).   
Both the intellectual elites and the mass public of the Soviet Union at the time were 
looking towards the West and the United States for tangible hope of a better life for 
themselves and their children (Shiraev and Zubok, 2000). After almost 70 years of the 
communist system the Russians looked up to Western Europe and the United States as 
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more effective social systems. In the minds of many Russians, dismantling the communist 
system and adhering to capitalism and a more liberal ideology could bring instant 
gratification and provide for stable and effective economic, social and political systems. 
More and more people saw the communist system as the obstacle that prevented Russia 
from becoming part of civilized society, while the United States represented the future and 
“symbolized great new opportunity, unlimited potential, prosperity and happiness” 
(Shiraev and Zubok, 2000, p. 144).  
Volkov (2015) described the new enthusiasm of the Russian people towards the 
United States: “In early 1990s, the majority of population in Russia saw the U.S. not only 
as a sole superpower, but also the undisputed role model, as the main reference point in the 
foreign policy.” Levada public opinion polls (Volkov, 2015) conducted in Russia in 1990-
1991 confirmed the popularity of the U.S. When asked what foreign country was the most 
interesting and fascinating to them, respondents placed the United States on the top of the 
list. Seventy four percent of respondents thought that cooperation with the U.S. was more 
important than with any other Western countries.    
 
The Years of Yeltsin: disenchantment with the West and the search for national identity     
The brief period of admiring the United States was followed by a backlash in public 
attitudes when the collapse of the Soviet Union led to chaos, ethnic violence, mass 
pauperization, and the collapse of the welfare state. As Trilupaityte (2008) explained, the 
end of the communist system and Russia’s embrace of democracy and a market economy 
in the early 1990s created “a symbolic positioning of Russian vis-à-vis American power” 
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(p. 82), and gave the people an impression their country would soon achieve the living 
standards of the United States and Western Europe. However, the new Russian state proved 
to be a harsh and unforgiving environment for most of its citizens. Instead of improving 
the standards of living as people hoped, the changes in the Russian state left most people 
worse off than they were under the Soviet system, both economically and in terms of social 
status.   
The enormous difficulties the Russian people faced in the early 1990s contributed 
to the growth of anti-Americanism among the Russian public (Shiraev and Zubok, 2000). 
As Trilupaityte (2008) explained, pro-American attitudes in the late 1980s and the early 
1990s were actively propagated by the Russian liberals, many of whom became high-level 
officials in the Yeltsin government. Positive image of the United States was associated in 
the public mind with the liberal ideology. The failure of the economic reforms, social and 
economic crisis that followed led to disenchantment with the new Russian government, 
and discredited both the liberal ideology and the pro-American position (Shlapentokh, 
1998). 
Shiraev and Zubok (2000) pointed out that in the minds of the Russian people the 
communist system had significant flaws, but the new Russian society was facing even 
greater difficulties. The physiological consequence of these events was once again a rise 
of anti-Americanism in Russia. As authors explained, “America, with its perceived attitude 
of indifference toward Russia’s troubles, arrogant advisers, and unattainable wealth 
became a scapegoat, the cause of the Russian troubles, the country that willingly let Russia 
fall to her knees (Shiraev and Zubok, 2000, p. 145).” 
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The Russian government, and to some extent the general public, expected the 
United States to help the struggling Russian economy during the crisis in the early 1990s. 
According to the Levada Center public opinion polls in 1991, 37% of Russians expected 
the U.S. to help the Russian economy and a majority felt certain the U.S. would provide 
aid (Volkov, 2015). Deeply disappointed by the lack of financial aid from the West aimed 
at supporting the new and struggling Russian economy, Russians felt that their country was 
being treated as a lesser nation. To them, the Soviet Union had its flaws and failures, but it 
was an empire. The post-fall Russian resented the lack of support, especially during the 
severe economic crisis (Shiraev and Zubok, 2000). In addition, both elites and the general 
public in Russia were becoming increasingly frustrated over the loss of the status of a great 
geopolitical force.  
The Russian Federation, up until the late 1990s, did not play a major role in the 
international arena, and the actions of Western nations towards Russia lead to a widely 
perceived sense of national humiliation (Shiraev and Zubok, 2000). Both Gorbachev and 
Yeltsin expected to see changes in the balance of power after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, leading to a bipolar balance, a reduction in U.S. expansionist policies and a 
reduction of the role of NATO. Instead, NATO expanded its membership to include several 
former Warsaw Pact countries and even three Baltic countries that used to be part of the 
Soviet Union. The European Union also gradually expanded to the East. Both expansions 
were perceived by Russian leaders and the Russian public as encirclement of Russia by the 
Western countries threatening Russia’s national security. 
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Another element affecting the change in attitudes of the Russian public towards the 
U.S. was a renewed search for national identity, and with this search a rising popularity of 
nationalistic-leaning movements, fueled by the Russophile ideology. According to Shiraev 
and Zubok (2000), it was a blending of the ideas of Russian exceptionalism, leadership as 
a Eurasian nation, and the uniqueness of Russia’s history and rich culture that called for a 
special, exclusive way of development. According to these views, the Western economic 
systems and especially Western values were foreign and alien to Russians, who had their 
own special destiny, and were more spiritual and cultured than the West.    
As Shiraev and Zubok (2000) noted, despite a growing resentment towards the 
West and the U.S., anti-Americanism in 1990s did not “become virulent and never assumed 
a violent form.” Since the first surveys examining public attitudes towards the United 
States were conducted in Russia, for almost a decade the Russian public had a generally 
positive view of the U.S. According to Levada polls, more than 65% of Russians steadily 
expressed positive attitudes from 1990 to 1998. Although the number of pro-American 
respondents was slowly declining and the number of people who expressed negative 
opinion rose from 5% in 1991 to around 25% in early 1998, the majority of Russians 
viewed the United States in positive to neural terms. The majority of Russians found 
themselves deeply pessimistic, and too focused on the shortcomings of their personal 
economic lives to find great interest in geopolitical opinion making (Shiraev and Zubok, 
2000).  
By the late 1990s, public attitudes towards the U.S. in Russia began to change. In 
1997, according to Levada, half of the Russian population saw Russia and the U.S. not as 
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allies, but as geopolitical rivals. Volkov (2015) suggested that the major change in the way 
the Russian public perceived the U.S. took place in 1998-1999. Several events took place 
in the two year span that have affected both relations between two countries and the 
attitudes of the Russian public towards the United States. Volkov (2015) explained the 
spike of anti-American attitudes as a reaction to a combination of foreign and domestic 
events, such as the NATO Serbian military campaign, the beginning of war in Chechnya, 
the financial crisis in Russia and NATO’s expansion to the east. He pointed out that those 
events had a profound impact on how the United States were perceived by the Russian 
public. 
The Serbian military campaign against Slobodan Milosevic was perceived by the 
Russian elites and a majority of the Russian public as “America’s desire to establish control 
over additional territories, rather than an attempt to enforce international norms and punish 
their violators” (Volkov, 2015). At the same time, Yeltsin’s attempts to influence the 
conflict by sending Russian troops to Serbia were extremely popular in Russia among elites 
and the general population. Shiraev and Zubok (2000) said Yeltsin’s actions in Serbia were 
applauded at home because they made the Russian public feel that their country was 
regaining influence in the international arena. This lesson, according to Volkov (2015), 
was learned very well by the Russian authorities, who used foreign policy and anti-
Americanism to booster patriotic feeling among Russian and to increase domestic support 
for their policies.  
Volkov (2015) suggested that coinciding with the military campaign in Serbia, a 
certain way of interpreting American actions were first developed, and that this shaped the 
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way both Russian elites and the general public perceived the future military operations 
where U.S. forces were involved. According to this logic, U.S. involvement was an act of 
self-interest, an attempt to gain control over territory, and had little to nothing to do with 
any U.S. declared desire to enforce international law or prevent human rights violations. 
Public opinion polls conducted by the Levada Center showed that each of the following 
conflicts (including Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, and Syria) was interpreted according to this 
logic by more than half of the Russian population.    
 
Putin and Medvedev: The pendulum swings 
By 1999, even before Vladimir Putin was elected to his first term as president, 
public opinion polls in Russia demonstrated that the mass public had begun to perceive 
actions of the United States as hostile to Russian interests. For example, according to 
Volkov (2015), 75% of Russians agreed with the statement that “the U.S. is taking 
advantage of Russia’s troubles to turn it into a second-class country,” and for the first time 
in a decade they placed the United States at the top of the list of countries that pose a threat 
to Russia.   
In the decade following Putin’s first election, the nationalistic, anti-American views 
were increasingly incorporated into official Kremlin rhetoric. Since the mid-2000s, 
Russian authorities have used anti-Americanism as one of the key elements of state 
propaganda. As Levada’s polling numbers showed, most Russians have interpreted the 
actions of the United States during conflicts in Iraq, Georgia and even Ukraine as being 
hostile towards Russia.  
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With the help of an increasingly anti-American stance purported by Russian 
authorities and communicated by the state-run media, even events in neighboring countries 
began to be seen by the Russian public as a result of American anti-Russian actions. For 
example, more than half of the Russian population assigned blame for the 
Russian/Georgian war, which was indisputably initiated by the unilateral aggression of the 
Russian Federation, on the United States and American desires to extend influence to 
Russian neighbors (Volkov, 2015).  
The events of 9/11 and the cooperation between George W. Bush and Vladimir 
Putin during its immediate aftermath in fighting global terrorism produced a temporary 
spike in pro-American sentiments among the Russian public. Soon after, however, the 
levels of anti-Americanism in Russia returned to a pre 9/11 levels.  
 
The rise of anti-Americanism: 2012-2015 
Levada polls showed that a significant increase in anti-American attitudes among 
the Russian public began in late 2012, in tandem with anti-government protests that took 
place all over Russia from November 2012. Mass protests took place in Moscow, St. 
Petersburg and other Russian cities. Initially the protests were focused on people’s 
dissatisfaction with the results of the Duma elections, which according to various 
independent observers were rigged in favor of Putin/Medvedev United Russia party. As 
the protests continued, the underlying theme evolved to reflect a broader and more general 
anti-Putin sentiment.  
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In a response to the mass protests, the Kremlin initiated a mass propaganda 
campaign aimed at discrediting the protest movement and boosting support for the 
authorities. Putin, Medvedev and other public officials openly accused the United States of 
orchestrating and financing the protest movement with hopes of destabilizing the political 
situation in Russia. An infamous documentary, “Anatomy of the protest,” represented the 
new wave of anti-American and anti-Western propaganda campaign. In addition to 
discrediting the oppositional movement by portraying it as a sell-out to the West, the 
Kremlin and state-controlled mass media were attempting to divert public attention away 
from the wide-spread accusations of corruption within the Putin government.  
The rise of anti-Americanism continued after March 2012, when Putin was elected 
president for the third term. After a year and a half of Putin’s presidency, polls showed a 
significant worsening in public attitudes about the United States. According to the Levada 
Center, by November 2013, 49.2% of respondents expressed negative opinion, and 37.4% 
expressed positive views about the United States.  
By January 2015, after annexation of Crimea, the beginning of the civil war in 
Ukraine and the introduction of sanctions against Russian by a number of foreign counties 
lead by the U.S., anti-American sentiments in Russia reached the highest peak in post-
Soviet history. The new Cold War between Vladimir Putin and the West was reflected in 
Russian public opinion, while policies of the president were supported by 85% of 
respondents.  
Gudkov (2014) and Volkov (2015) suggested that the dramatic rise of anti-
American sentiments in Russia in 2014/2015 was a combination of several factors, 
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including events in Ukraine, the Kremlin’s propaganda campaign and the public’s 
perception of Putin’s foreign policy as a resurrection of great Russia and the restoration of 
national pride.  
The Maidan revolution was perceived by the Russian public within a framework 
shaped and propagated by the Russian authorities through mass media. The general public 
perception of the events in Ukraine was as scheming on the part of the West and mainly 
the United States against the Russian interests. When asked why people protested in 
Ukraine, almost half of respondents (44%) thought the West was trying to pull Ukraine 
into the orbit of its political interests. Other popular reasons included nationalistic attitudes 
and attempts to pull Ukraine away from Russia. Some 84% of respondents viewed events 
in Ukraine as a coup-d'etat. The ongoing civil war in the Eastern Ukraine was viewed by 
the Russian public in the same interpretation scheme. According to Volkov, in the summer 
of 2015, 56% of Russian respondents thought that the conflict continued because it was 
“advantageous for the government of the United States and other Western countries,” while 
only 6% blamed Russian involvement. 
 While the events in Ukraine coincided with an intense anti-Western and anti-
American propaganda campaign, Volkov argued that the influence of state-sponsored 
propaganda was not the only reason for the dramatic rise of anti-Americanism. 
The actions of Vladimir Putin in the international arena, as well as his aggressive 
nationalistic rhetoric, seemed to deeply resonate with the Russian public. From 2014, his 
support rating continued to exceed 80% and in June 2015 it reached an unprecedented 98%. 
Volkov (2015) argued that Putin’s foreign policy victories, such as the annexation of 
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Crimea and the inability of the West to counter Russia’s actions, “gave a majority of 
Russians the sense for the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union that their country 
was a superpower (70% of respondents feel this way, compared to just 47% in 2011).” 
The anti-Western attitudes of the Russian public were also reflected in their 
attitudes towards the European Union. Russian attitudes towards their European neighbors 
for 20 years have been consistently better than attitudes towards the United States. 2014-
2015 Levada polls showed that the sentiments of Russians about the European Union were 
slightly more positive than their views about the United States, but followed a very similar 
pattern.  
  
Conclusions  
For a century, the United States played a major role in the worldview and 
imagination of the Russian and Soviet people. In the first decades of the Soviet Union the 
United States occupied an important niche in the mass psyche: the United States became a 
Western country to which the Russian people compared themselves. Even though credible 
public opinion polling numbers from the Soviet period are not available, a number of other 
sources indicate changes in the public sentiment.  
While the United States remained the main official ideological foe of the Soviet 
Union throughout the Cold War, public attitudes towards the United States were more 
complicated and ambivalent. Part of the Soviet population believed the official propaganda 
and held anti-American views, but others were fascinated with the United States culture 
and were sympathetic towards the American people in general. These neutral and even 
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sympathetic attitudes rose and fell throughout the history of the Soviet Union depending 
on multiple factors, including relations between two countries, political situation in the 
Soviet Union, and influence of popular culture.   
During Perestroika, initiated by Gorbachev, relations between the two countries 
drastically changed for the better. The new pro-American official position was supported 
by the population: in 1990, according to the Levada Center, over 80% of Russians 
expressed positive attitude towards the United States.   
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian public went through a brief 
period of intense infatuation and idolization of the West and the United States. When 
Russians faced an economic and social collapse, however, they were faced with the reality 
that their dreams of living in a society similar to the West in terms of the living standards 
were unrealistic and dissatisfaction and discontent began to increase. While relations 
between two countries remained constructive and even friendly at times during the 
following decade, both the elites and the general public in Russia started to turn away from 
the West.  
Experts (Gudkov, 2014; Shlapentokh, 2006; 2011; Zubok and Shiraev, 2000; 
Volkov, 2015) suggested that a change in perception of the West and the United States 
during the 1990s was influenced by psychological trauma from the collapse of the Soviet 
empire and the loss of international status, significant loss of territory and the integration 
of some of the former Soviet states into European Union and NATO, perceived aggressive 
expansion of the Western sphere of influence to the Russian borders, and ongoing 
economic hardships. This growing irritation and disenchantment with the West coincided 
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with the formation of the new Russian national identity, which incorporated elevating and 
highlighting the uniqueness of the Russian culture and civilization, and presented the 
Western way of life and societal structure as alien and destructive for Russia.    
The general perception of the United States also was affected by an interpretation 
of American actions that originated during the U.S. military operation against Slobodan 
Milosevic in Serbia in 1999. U.S. actions were perceived as disregarding of international 
norms and state sovereignty, and solely focused on self-interest and the expansion of geo-
political influence. In addition, the United States began to be perceived as an arrogant 
super-power focused on holding Russia back and threatening Russian national interests. 
Such a way of viewing the United States and interpreting American actions framed 
perceptions of a large part of the Russian public. These sentiments, increasingly reinforced 
via mass media, were incorporated into official Kremlin rhetoric after 2000.  
Improvement of relations between the two countries (Putin and Bush after 9/11 and 
Medvedev and Obama during the “reset”) coincided with a decrease of anti-American 
attitudes among the Russian public. Soon after, however, attitudes of Russian towards the 
United States returned to the pre-improvement level.    
Public opinion polls conducted by the Levada Center demonstrated that the 
sentiments of the Russian public towards the United States were relatively consistent from 
the mid-1990s until 2012. Pro-American attitudes were expressed by 55% to 60% of 
respondents, while the anti-American views were held by approximately a third of the 
respondents. During this period, polls showed four spikes of anti-American sentiments: in 
1999, 2003, 2008, and since 2014.  
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Volkov (2015) suggested those peaks of anti-Americanism in Russia could be 
explained by Kremlin’s propaganda efforts conducted through mass media. In order to 
understand the reasons behind the success of the state-sponsored anti-American 
propaganda, however, one needs to study the intricacies of Russian public opinion and the 
peculiarities of the attitudes of Russians towards the United States.  
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Chapter 4  
Mass Media System in Russia 
“Post-Soviet” media: the Soviet influence on the Russian media system  
It is almost impossible to understand the contemporary Russian media system 
without looking into the past and examining the history of mass media in the country. 
Various scholars focused their attention on the fact that the Russian media system 
originated from the debris of the Soviet media system, and made attempts to re-evaluate 
the Soviet experience in the light of contemporary events (for example, see Splichal, 1994; 
De Smaele, 1999; Becker, 2004; Kratasyuk, 2006).    
Strict governmental control over the content of mass media and editorial policies, 
as well as the use of the media to advocate and promote positions of the state was not an 
invention of the Soviet State. Strict control over the content of mass media was the 
governmental policy in the Russian empire since the first newspapers were introduced by 
Tsar Peter the Great in the 17th century and up until the revolution of 1905. However, after 
the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 the absolute state control over the public sphere in 
general and mass media specifically reached its peak.  
Following the birth of the Soviet state in 1917, the media system in the Soviet 
Union was based on Marxist ideology and was ideologically committed to the promoting 
and furthering the goals of the Communist Party (De Smalle, 1999). As Jakubowitz argued, 
the authorities in the Soviet Union viewed the press as an instrument of social management: 
“they fulfilled for the state the hegemonic functions of dominance, ideological 
homogenization of the audience and reproduction of the existing social order” (Jakubowitz, 
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1995, p. 127). Lenin, the founding father of the Soviet state, described the role of the press 
in a communist society as “the collective propagandist, collective agitator and collective 
organizer” (Lenin, 1966). De Smaele (1999) argued that propaganda was the main function 
of the Soviet press, and that partisanship and serving the working class was the most 
important principle.    
Two scholars of the post-communist media systems, Sparks and Jakubowicz, 
argued that the communist past and mentality had an enormous influence on 
transformations of the socio-political and media systems in post-communists countries 
(Jakubowicz, 2005; Sparks, 2008). Sparks argued that the nature of transformation that 
post-communist countries were going through was the creation of the new social order. 
Based on this perspective, Jakubowicz suggested that the final transformation and 
democratization of the media systems in post-communist countries would happen only 
when the social order would be finally transformed, and “the legacy of Communism 
(however that is defined) is finally eliminated”  (Jakubowitz, 2005).        
The influence of the Soviet past on the current media system in Russia is discussed 
and argued by various scholars. As a review of literature demonstrates, those effects are 
strong, varied in nature and could be found at every level of the media-political system in 
Russia. Numerous works on the Russian media system today refer to the issue of deep-
rooted Soviet mentality of the Russian public, decision makers and the journalistic 
community.  
The main topics of discussion include the Soviet mentality of the audience, 
journalists and the decision makers that influence their attitudes towards the freedom of the 
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press and the role of media in society. The Soviet past seemed to influence media 
consumption behavior and expectations, and relationship between the media and the state.  
In the post-Soviet Russia, the inherited Soviet mentality and attitudes affected not 
only mass media audiences, but the journalistic community as well. For example, the IREX 
Media Sustainability Index 2013 quoted one of panelists (IREX assembles a panel of local 
experts in each country, drawn from the country’s media outlets, nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs), professional associations, and academic institutions in order to 
assess the development of media systems), who stressed the negative effects of self-
censorship practices among Russian journalists and editors and blamed the problem on the 
Soviet mentality:  
Self-censorship is the main problem of Russian media. I believe that it 
happens because there are few young people among the heads of media 
companies. Most often they are people who remember Soviet times and bear 
a Soviet imprint of living in a constant fear of superiors (IREX Media 
Sustainability Index, 2013). 
 
As late as 2013, IREX Index also reported the diminishing value of freedom of 
speech in Russian society. According to Russian panelists, the concept of free speech was 
perceived as unpatriotic and anti-state. As one of the panelists noted, “Many people prefer 
to have less freedom in exchange for more social protection” (IREX Media Sustainability 
Index, 2013). Such attitudes displayed by the public more than two decades after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union underline how deeply rooted the Soviet mentality was among 
the Russian people.   
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Transitions and transformations of the media system: 1990s 
In 1991, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia began a long journey of 
painful transitions and transformations from a totalitarian state with a one-party system to 
a multi-party representative democracy. Every element of the Russian society was going 
through a transformation, including the media system (Becker, 2004). De Smaele noted 
that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia switched from a one-party totalitarian 
system to a multi-party democratic system, with the economy being transformed from 
planned command-type to market, which “resulted in an increasing openness and diversity 
in both political life and media practices” (de Smaele, 1999, p. 176).  
In addition, the Russian government officially adopted the principles of press 
freedom and freedom of expression, reflected in the Constitution and the media laws. 
According to Davis (1998), those changes influenced the mentality and professional 
practices of Russian journalists, who demonstrated openness to Western ideas and practices 
of journalism.  
The transformation, however, of the political system from totalitarian to democratic 
in the early 1990s, as well as the transfer of mass media ownership from the state into a 
mixed system of privately owned and state-owned media outlets, did not by default mean 
transition from totalitarian media system into a European social-responsibility model or an 
American libertarian model. De Smaele (1999) argued, after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, when the Russian society (including the media system) was reorganized according 
to the western principals, the changes in the media were mostly restricted to the market 
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area, but the underlying transformation of the media system into a westernized, public-
interest focused model did not happen. 
De Smaele argued against perceiving the Russian media system as being brought 
in line with the West. Some scholars of the Russian media have pointed out as early as 
1996, that “Russia is simulating only” (de Smaele, 1999), and that the new system of the 
oligarchic capitalism that emerged in Russia during the Yeltsin era of the 1990s has 
influenced the Russian media system, once again turning mass media into instruments of 
political influence and propaganda.   
In the 1990s, a transformed and blooming Russian media landscape had distinctive 
features and defined the media-political system in Russia. The print media landscape was 
differentiated in terms of ownership, but most print outlets were identified with different 
political parties and interests (mostly those who were in power), “thus continuing the 
tradition of the ‘advocacy press’, rather than performing a watchdog function” (Splichal, 
1994). According to De Smaele (1999), in the 1990s mass media in Russia turned into a 
battlefield of different financial groups and oligarchs, connected to various political and 
governmental clans. Pankin (1998) pointed out that in Russia and other former Soviet 
Union countries, capital was made through political connections between oligarchs and the 
government, and the owners of mass media outlets used them as instruments of gaining 
and increasing political influence.        
The broadcast medium was transformed from a Soviet model of universal 
dominance by the state into a dual system of public (state-controlled) and private 
broadcasting media outlets. The public broadcasting system in Russia, however, should not 
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be mistakenly identified with Western European public broadcasting. As Jakubowicz 
(2005) stressed, Western European public broadcasting is based on the notion of serving 
the public interest, not the government, and that in order to achieve this goal public 
broadcasting must be separate and independent from the state’s interests and influences. In 
Russia, however, public broadcasting was not given legal and organizational independence 
from the state, which, as De Samele (1999) argued, resulted throughout the years in 
subordination of broadcasting to the state, and led to the transformation of the public media 
into state-controlled media serving the interests of those in power.  
The governmental control over public broadcasting was implemented through 
financial and organizational means, which, as De Smaele (1999) pointed out, translated 
into direct and indirect pressure on editorial policy and programming content. For example, 
the appointment of the management teams of the public broadcasting companies was left 
to the state. As Splichal (1994) noted, even though the appointments were made by elected 
officials instead of the Communist Party apparatchiks, as it was in the Soviet Union, the 
negative effects on the independence of editorial policies were quite similar:         
Although the new system differs from the ‘socialist’ one in that these 
functions (e.g. appointing personnel) were transferred from the Communist 
Party to the democratically elected state organs, this does not change the 
fundamental relations of the dependence of the media on external political 
authorities and the reduction of the public to a mass of passive consumers 
(Splichal, 1994). 
 
However, even with an increasing partisanship with the mass media in 1990s, both 
Kratasyuk (2006) and Becker (2004) stressed that President Yeltsin was a strong believer 
in the importance of a free press in a democratic society, and that the press in Yeltsin era 
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enjoyed relative independence from the government. Russian journalist and media scholar 
Gessen (2000) described the Yeltsin’s position on the freedom of press as follows: 
The editors-in-chief of Russia’s various national media took comfort in the 
fact that, to Yeltsin, media freedom was a baseline value…. Yeltsin replaced 
communist ideology with a supremely simplified version of democracy that 
boiled down to two tenets: He could not abide Communists, and he 
supported freedom of the press (Gessen, 2000, p. 17).  
 
During Yeltsin’s time, Russian mass media displayed a relative pluralism of 
positions in both print and broadcast media, and journalists could be openly critical towards 
the government (even on such hot topics as corruption and war in Chechnya). The 
government did not attempt to implement strict control over the media outlets, even those 
“public” outlets where the state had controlling financial interest (De Smaele, 1999). As 
McNair (2000) described the state of the Russian media in 2000, at the beginning of Putin’s 
first term: 
There is in Russia today a real public sphere through which ordinary people 
can learn about and participate in political debate. The current generation of 
Russian politicians may be largely incompetent and hugely corrupt, but 
their activities are frequently exposed to critical scrutiny in the public 
domain where citizens can make their judgments (McNair, 2000, p. 93). 
 
Vladimir Putin, media freedom and consolidation of state control  
The situation changed dramatically after Vladimir Putin gained power, first by 
becoming the prime minister in 1999 and then being elected as Russia’s second president 
in 2000. Since then, reports by various international organizations advocating for freedom 
of the press across the globe placed Russia on the list of countries where mass media is 
partially free or not free at all and where journalists are endangered for their professional 
activities.  
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As Becker said in 2004, “The Putin era has not been a good one for the Russian 
media” (Becker, 2004, p. 139). He argued that the mass media system in Russia under Putin 
has regressed considerably, and that “Russia has failed to consolidate the nascent 
democratic media system that began to emerge under the former Soviet leader Mikhail 
Gorbachev and Russia’s first president, Boris Yeltsin” (Becker, 2004, p. 140). 
Soon after the beginning of his first presidential term, Putin initiated an aggressive 
campaign against the media outlets that were critical of him and his policies, especially of 
the actions of his administration in Chechnya. His attitudes toward freedom of the press 
and speech were made evident in his first address to the Russian nation as president in 
2000. Mass media in Russia, according to Putin, were divided into “state” and “anti-state,” 
while the privately owned media that were critical of the authority were “mass 
misinformation outlets,” and “means of the struggle against the state” (Albats, 2001). 
Those words were soon translated into actions.     
      Strengthening of the governmental control over the free flow of information in 
Russia began with the broadcast media (Becker, 2004; Kratasyuk, 2006). During the course 
of several years, Putin’s government managed to gain control over the four most popular 
and prominent TV networks in Russia, including NTV (НТВ), TV-6, RTR and ORT.  
As Becker (2004) explained, the latter two networks were initially part of the public 
broadcasting system and the changes in editorial policy and content were implemented by 
appointing new leadership, politically loyal to Putin’s administration. The other two 
networks, however, were privately owned. NTV, the leading nation-wide news network 
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that was known for its objective reporting and open criticisms of Russian authorities, was 
taken away from the owner Gusinsky by a selective application of tax and criminal law.     
The government’s takeover of the broadcasting systems had special significance 
for the media landscape in Russia. Kratasyuk (2006) stressed the importance of television 
news in Russia, noting that Russian television had an “integral, out-look forming role… 
vital for the community” (Kratasyuk, 2006, p. 34). She argued that within the context of 
the high level of uncertainty that the Russian society was experiencing after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, broadcast media played an integral role in shaping of society, creating 
national identity and transmitting meanings and interpretations imposed by dominant 
elites. During Putin’s time in power, according to Kratasyuk, the state-run mass media was 
actively engaged in promoting to the public a pan-Russian national identity, centered in the 
idea of a single strong state:  
Television is used in order to search for and construct the values ‘that unite 
all’. It is a ‘monolithic’ system of historical norms and political preferences, 
sanctioned by the state…. The absence of public opinion shaping 
mechanisms, combined with an acutely felt desire for self-identification, for 
the creation of an ‘image of Russia’ (i.e. search for identity) leads to the 
development, whereby simultaneous watching of TV programmers 
becomes, for the majority of Russians, the only mechanism holding society 
together (Kratasyuk, 2006, p. 37-38).     
 
Yevgeniy Revenko, deputy director of news programming for All-Russia State 
Television (VGTRK), in 2004 described delivering the government’s message as the 
primary goal of state television: “A country like Russia needs the sort of television that can 
effectively deliver the government’s message… As the state grows stronger, it needs to 
convey its message directly, with no interpretations” (Gessen, 2012, p. 185).  
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The editorial policy, he added, was to deliver official messages without 
interpretation:  
We do broadcast negative stories – we will report a disaster, if it occurs, for 
example – but we do not go looking for them. Nor do we go looking for 
positive stories, but we do focus viewers’ attention on them. We never 
speculate about the reasons for something, – say, an official firing – even if 
we happen to know the reason. All our information comes from official 
government statements (Gessen, 2012, p. 185).  
 
According to Revenko, criticizing the president was off limits for state television: 
“In any case, the logic is simple. We are a state television company. Our state is a 
presidential republic. That means we do not criticize the president” (Gessen, 2012, p. 185). 
Revenko’s testimony demonstrated that as early as 2004, the state-controlled news 
media began transforming into a second press office of president Putin, delivering the 
governmental message to the public without interpretation, alteration or any attempts to 
follow standards of journalistic objectivity.  
A similar process of consolidating state control, according to Becker (2004), 
happened to the print press after Putin came to power. By changing the leadership and 
editorial staff, the state managed to align the editorial policies and content of the state-run 
national and local newspapers with the position of Putin’s administration. Thus, 
newspapers were turned into active supporters and advocates of president Putin and his 
government.  
Privately owned oppositional-leaning newspapers experienced continuous 
economic and legal pressure from the state, followed by personal attacks and harassment 
of the journalists who were critical of Putin (Kratasyuk, 2006). The IREX Media 
Sustainability Index 2013 stated that during Putin’s time in the 2000s, “the Russian 
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executive authorities built a strong vertical base of power in the country and took control 
over majority of Russian media, especially television channels, turning them into 
instruments of state propaganda.”  
The ability of Russian authorities to implement control over mass media was 
enhanced by three factors (Becker, 2004). First, the state owned a great number of media 
outlets at the local and national level. Second, because of the peculiarities of Russian 
business environment during the 1990s (when a great number of business transaction were 
done illegally or involved corruption), the state was able to implement control and dictate 
behavior of media moguls by threatening them with selective application of the law. 
Finally, the weakness of the judicial system in Russia and its close connection to the 
executive branch turned the courts into a mechanism of punishment for those who criticized 
the authorities.    
Simon & Strovsky (2006) argued that self-censorship by journalists and media 
organizations was another important element of the Russian media system during Putin’s 
years in office. They defined self-censorship as “censorship [that] is conducted internally 
by the media in order to avoid annoying or offending someone (and thus avoid possible 
sanction or punishment), without being specifically told or ordered to do so officially by 
an external censor (p. 191).” Pavel Gutiontov, a member of the Russian Union of 
Journalists, described the resurrection of self-censorship among journalists after Putin was 
elected:  
The sad thing is that it is the press that is readily guessing what the 
authorities would want it to print… The internal censor is once again 
becoming the main censor… We have to do a lot of work in eradicating out 
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inner slave from ourselves, from out editorial rooms, from television 
(Gutionotov, 2004).   
     
Becker (2004) described transformations of the media system during Putin’s years 
in office as a neo-authoritarian media model, where “formal democratic institutions may 
appear to exist, but they are rotten to the core” (Becker, 2004, p. 150). He argued that the 
media system under Putin revealed its authoritarian and state-controlled nature in the areas 
of media autonomy, legal protection, as well as control over the content and pluralism of 
positions displayed in mass media.     
Such assessments of the media-political system in Russia and of the relations 
between the state and mass media seemed to be even more accurate almost a decade later, 
at the end of Medvedev’s presidency. By 2010-2011, the main source of information 
available to the Russian public was television. According to the Levada Center, around 
85% of respondents named state TV channels as their main source of information in the 
country. Broadcasting was heavily dominated by three federal channels. According to 
IREX Media Sustainability Index 2012, the top three television stations were Russia 1 
(broadcasting rating 18.2%), Channel 1 (broadcasting rating 17%), NTV (broadcasting 
rating 13.8%). Channel One and All-Russia State Television were under direct 
governmental control, while NTV was owned by the state-controlled energy company 
Gazprom.     
According to Lipman (2010), the state-controlled media, especially television, were 
used by Russian authorities to maintain popular support and persuade and convince the 
audience of the efficacy off federal policy and actions:  
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The three [TV] channels perfectly serve the political goals of the 
government to shape electoral opinion by boosting, playing down, or 
ignoring an issue, a figure, or a group and instilling sentiments that benefit 
the political interests of the leadership. This is a sophisticated operation that 
capitalizes on and deepens existing suspicion of the West and frustration 
over Russia’s diminished status in the world (Lipman, 2010). 
 
Authors of the IREX Index argued that although there were a great number of 
news sources in Russia, the audience was not exposed to a variety of viewpoints, and the 
state media served as instruments of governmental propaganda (IREX, 2012). Reporters 
Without Borders’ Freedom of the Press report (2012) stressed the dominance of state-
controlled media in the Russian media landscape and the limited plurality of news 
sources:  
Russian media freedom remained extremely poor in 2011, with the Kremlin 
relying on both crude and sophisticated forms of media management to 
distract the public from widespread government corruption, terrorist 
attacks, and the country’s economic troubles…. Most state and privately 
owned mass media engaged in blatant propaganda that glorified the 
country’s national leaders and fostered an image of political pluralism, as 
the government maintained control over key television outlets (Reporters 
Without Borders, Freedom of the Press Report, 2012).  
 
While broadcasting remained under strict governmental control, the print press 
and online media enjoyed a relative degree of freedom. According to IREX, a “small but 
stable group of media outlets adhere to principles of fair, independent journalism and 
manage to function in a market distorted by subsidies and preferences for state-affiliated 
media” (IREX Media Sustainability Index 2012). The same report stated that while 
alternative news and opinion were available through independent media outlets, most of 
Russians did not use those sources of information.  
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The web was less tightly controlled by the state compared to other sources of 
information. The number of Russians who used the Internet by 2012 reached half of the 
population, and online users had access to plurality of information sources, presenting 
various points of views on events in Russia, including politics. Social media, specifically 
blogs and social networks, were providing alternative view points and were gaining 
popularity among Russian internet users (Freedom House, Freedom of the Press, 2012).  
 
Mass media since 2012: shrinking freedoms and growing propaganda  
The limited freedom of press and of speech that existed in Russia prior to 2012 
was drastically challenged by two consequential political events.  
The first, a wave of state sponsored suppression against independent journalists, 
mass media outlets, and general political expression on the internet, was the reaction of 
Russian authorities to mass protests that started in late 2011. The protests were a response 
to legislative elections that were allegedly riddled with fraud in order to ensure a victory 
for the ruling United Russia party. This election was soon followed by Putin’s 
announcement that he will run for President in 2012 after having already served two 
terms from 2000-2008. These events resulted in mass protests in Moscow and around the 
country (Barry, 2011). People were protesting election fraud, a corrupt governmental 
system and the person of Vladimir Putin. Two of the protests in Moscow, according to 
organizers, drew crowds of 120,000 (on December 24, 2011) and 160,000 people 
(February 4, 2012) (Bratersky & Krainova, 2011; RIA Novosti, 2012).  
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Russian authorities responded by organizing mass rallies across Russia in support 
of the government and the United Russia party. In addition the state initiated violent 
repressive measures against protesters by the police and imposed heavy financial 
penalties against unauthorized public rallies. (Birnbaum, 2013). The last mass protest 
took place on Bolotnaya Square in Moscow on May 6, 2012. This protest lead to mass 
arrests of participants and alleged organizers, several of whom were later charged with 
organizing unauthorized riots and violence against the police. Eight protesters received 
prison sentences, varying from two years and six months to four and a half years (Bodner 
& Lammey, 2012).    
In an effort to codify the state’s new position and to avoid future flare-ups of civil 
unrest, a number of new bills were drafted expanding governmental control over the 
online sphere. Most easily became law with overwhelming support of the Duma since 
2012 (Freedom House, 2015, 2014). In 2012, defamation was recriminalized, and a 
number of journalist, bloggers, oppositional politicians and civil rights activist were 
charged with defamation since the introduction of the law.  
A prime example of this newly restrictive legislative environment is seen in 
Federal Law No. 398, that came into force in February 2014.  This measure gave federal 
prosecutors authority to block websites without a court order if they were suspected of 
disseminating extremist content, calls for illegal rallies, or other forms of illegal 
activities. According to a Freedom House report (2015), this law was used on a regular 
basis by the Russian authorities to block independent and oppositional websites.  
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Another example is seen in Federal Law No. 97, which required all websites 
(including blogs) with daily audience over 3000 visitors to register with Roscomnadzor 
(telecommunication regulatory body) as a mass media outlet. This law expanded all the 
legal requirements and regulations imposed on traditional media to be applicable to 
online media and even personal blogs. In a later revision to this statute required that social 
media platforms and networks store information relating to Russian users on servers 
housed in Russia in order to give the state access to such data.  
After the 2012 presidential elections, when Vladimir Putin was once again elected 
President, the Russian authorities focused their attention on tightening control over the 
mass media sphere, and using mass media to shape and solidify public perception. 
According to the IREX report, 2012 was marked by massive changes in the management 
of various federal and local news organizations, initiated by Russian authorities. The 
report cited Russian journalist Olga Bakushinskaya, commenting on the Kremlin’s 
pressure on journalists, editors and news organizations:  
It is not about [government] taking control over one more TV channel—it 
is about taking control over all mass media like it was in the Soviet times 
when there were no Dozhd, no Echo, no Novoye Vremya, and when all 
media were using materials from Pravda…. This is very sad for journalists 
who want to be fair and cover things that actually happen rather than things 
that authorities want to see. I think that we are going to have very hard times 
for these journalists (IREX, Media Sustainability Index, 2012).    
 
If before 2012 oppositional politicians or activities were rarely covered by state-
controlled media, after the mass protests and Putin’s reelection the coverage changed. 
The Russian authorities used their control over mass media to discredit political 
opposition and boost support for Putin:  
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State-affiliated media were often used as instruments of pro-government 
and anti-opposition propaganda, such as the federal NTV channel’s 
“Anatomy of Protest” programs, which purported to prove foreign 
sponsorship and pay for opposition protestors. The TV Press Club, an 
informal community of journalists who cover television, called these and 
similar programs on the leading channel, Channel One, notable for their 
‘propagandist zeal, use of disinformation, facts juggling, and promoting 
intolerance to dissent’ (IREX, Media Sustainability Index, 2013).    
 
The crisis that fomented in Ukraine since late fall 2013 has since dominated news 
coverage in Russia. State-controlled mass media devoted an enormous amount of 
coverage to the Ukrainian events. The framing of the crisis by the state-controlled mass 
media, from the Maidan revolution to the annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of the 
civil war in Eastern Ukraine, was in complete solidarity with the official Kremlin position 
and the rhetoric of high-level public officials.  
REN-TV Deputy Editor-in-Chief Marianna Maskimovskaya commented on the 
dominance of the Ukrainian events in the Russian public sphere:  
Reading the press gives me a feeling that we live in Ukraine, rather than in 
Russia. We started this year on a positive note with the Olympics, and 
finished it with the feeling of all-encompassing aggression that literally fills 
the air; looking for internal and external enemies; jingoism bordering on the 
verge of chauvinism (IREX, Media Sustainability Index, 2013).    
 
Various international reports confirmed an increasing use of state-controlled mass 
media outlets as a delivery mechanism for anti-Ukrainian and anti-Western propaganda. 
Reporters Without Borders (2015) stressed the Kremlin’s strategic use of state-controlled 
mass media and increasing involvement in social media:  
Propaganda from state-owned media outlets intensified after Russia began 
its military intervention in Ukraine in early 2014. The most egregious 
disinformation was often reinforced by altered or falsely identified images. 
In April, for example, Russian media reported that Ukrainian authorities 
were building a concentration camp in eastern Ukraine, citing pictures that 
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actually showed the abandoned construction site of a European Union–
funded facility meant to house illegal migrants. Separately, Russian 
authorities continued to use paid commentators to influence online content. 
Media investigations have uncovered paid commenting campaigns 
organized by pro-Kremlin youth movements, and foreign media outlets in 
2014 reported a surge in propagandistic user comments on articles related 
to Russia or Ukraine (Reporters Without Borders, Freedom of the Press 
2015). 
 
In 2015, the Russian news website Colta.ru published a series of interviews with 
former journalists and news managers from the most prominent state-controlled mass 
media outlets in Russia. The people who were interviewed quit their jobs after the 
beginning of the escalation of events in Ukraine. These interviews provided unique insights 
into the drastic changes that took place in state-controlled mass media after the mass 
protests of 2012 and the beginning of conflict in Ukraine in 2013. These testimonies 
highlighted the transformation of the state-controlled media into what can most accurately 
be described as the Kremlin’s propaganda machine.   
The beginning of the events in Ukraine, according to Lisa Lerer, the former editor-
in-chief of the marketing department of TV channel “Russia-1,” brought a change in the 
coverage of news stories, but also made her feel that she could not any longer be open with 
her colleagues about her views that were critical of president Putin:    
But after protests and Ukraine I began to feel at work the way I did back in 
school [in the Soviet Union]. At school, I could not talk openly with friends 
about how I feel about the Soviet regime. I could not tell that I go to church. 
And why on the Saturday before Easter, it was necessarily for me to skip 
school. The same thing happened here [on TV channel “Russia”] (Sidorov, 
2015). 
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In the interview, Lerer explained her decision to quit her job by saying that at some 
point she became convinced that working for a state-controlled television station was 
tantamount to “complicity in a crime.”   
Other former employees of state-controlled broadcasting companies also pointed 
out a dramatic change in the editorial policy that took place in state-controlled television 
stations after the beginning of events in Ukraine. According to a former employee of the 
All-Russia State Television (VGTRK), the editor-in-chief of VGTRK announced the 
beginning of new Cold War in an editorial meeting in February 2014: 
There was a meeting in February 2014, when editor-in-chief said that the 
‘Cold War’ began. Not just an information war, because everybody already 
knew that information war started much earlier. But a ‘Cold War,’ which 
for many of us was a throwback. He said that a new era began, in 
comparison to which 70s and 80s were just a child’s play, and that those 
who do not wish to participate can find some other profession, outside of 
our television channel. All the rest – welcome to the club (Sidorov, 2015).   
 
Standards of journalistic objectivity, as they are understood in Western societies, 
were not applicable to the journalism practices of the state-run media outlets in Russia. 
Another former journalist from the All-Russia State Television (VGTRK) stressed an 
absence of any kind of journalistic standards among the employees of state-controlled 
television:  
If Khodorkovsky [former Russian businessman and oligarch, now in stark 
opposition to president Putin] came to power and organized his own 
channel, they would work for him; if a fascist came to power, they would 
be working for him as well.... If the situation suddenly changed, these 
people would not be able to return to normal journalism, to normal standards 
– simply because they do not know what those standards are. All of them 
would have to be lustrated, to be thrown out of the profession. [We would 
have to] hire all the new people and teach them differently (Sidorov, 2015). 
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Several former employees of state-controlled TV channels described the 
relationship between the Kremlin and the leadership of major broadcasting companies. 
According to their accounts, the editors-in-chief participated on a weekly basis in meetings 
with representatives of the presidential administration, where they were given detailed 
guidelines on how to cover the news for the coming week (Sidorov, 2015).    
From 2013 to 2015, state-controlled TV channels in Russia were transformed into 
a single propaganda machine designed to deliver a unified, Kremlin-approved message to 
the Russian audience. The transformation was described very well by a former 
correspondent of the All-Russia State Television:  
…There was no war between the channels anymore, that is, the competition 
did not exist anymore. There was an order from the Presidential 
Administration for us to stop bickering, stop competing who has more 
exclusive materials… Overall it [broadcasting by various TV channels] 
became a massive flow of information. Everybody [journalists from 
different TV channels] were sharing everything with each other: photos, 
speakers, and passed contacts to each other. All [TV channels] became one. 
Different companies, different shareholders, different media structures. A 
consolidated propaganda body was created (Sidorov, 2015).   
 
The effectiveness of the new consolidated propaganda campaign was demonstrated 
not only through public opinion polls that showed growing support for Putin and his 
policies, but also through growing ratings of the newscasts of the state-controlled TV 
stations.  
A limited number of news outlets attempted to adhere to the standards of 
journalistic objectivity in their coverage of events in Ukraine, but under constant pressure 
from the Russian authorities objective reporting was becoming increasingly difficult.    
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The Rise of Anti-Americanism in the Kremlin’s rhetoric and in mass media  
Another important consequence of the mass protests in Russia in late-2011 into 
2012 and the unraveling crisis in Ukraine was the increasingly anti-American and anti-
Western sentiments expressed publicly by the Russian leadership and subsequently 
supported by a parallel rise of anti-American faming expressed in state-controlled mass 
media (Birnbaum, 2013).  
Remnic (2014) suggested that the rise of official anti-American rhetoric was 
Putin’s attempt to suppress domestic opposition: “Putin, feeling betrayed by both the 
urban middle classes and the West, made it plain that he would go on the offensive against 
any sign of foreign interference, real or imagined. A raw and resentful anti-Americanism, 
unknown since the seventies, suffused Kremlin policy and the state-run airwaves.” 
The Russian president openly blamed the United States and the State Department 
for encouraging and financing the protests in Russia: “She [Hillary Clinton] set the tone 
that gave some of our activists inside the country a signal. They heard this signal and, 
under the support of the US state affairs, began their active work” (Weaver 2011). He 
also added that “hundreds of millions of dollars” are spent by foreign powers  in Russia 
with hopes of influencing political process” (Weaver 2011). This last remark turned into 
one of president Putin’s consistent talking points, accusing the United States of financing 
the Russian opposition. 
Putin’s rhetoric during the presidential campaign of 2012 became increasingly 
isolationist, anti-American and generally hostile to the West:   
Putin’s campaign focus has been external and bellicose, alluding to looming 
threats from abroad. Specifically, the campaign has singled out the United 
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States as a nefarious and untrustworthy meddler both internationally, as 
well as in Russia’s domestic politics. The repeated message essentially is 
this: Russia will have its rightful place on the world political stage once it 
has a military to be contended with; Russia will not tolerate what it 
perceives to be outside meddling in its internal affairs; and the election of 
Putin will ensure Russia’s security and stability (Sternhal, 2012).  
 
In March 2012, Putin won the presidential elections with 63.6% of the vote. Just 
as has been previously shown in the context of mass media and freedom of the press, 
Russian authorities moved quickly after the election and, under the pretense of limiting 
foreign influence on domestic affairs in Russia, to systematically suppress the activities 
of and erode the perceived legitimacy of non-governmental organizations, specifically 
those that were openly critical of the Russian government (Amnesty International, 2013).  
An openly anti-American framing was used by Russian authorities and, 
consequentially, state-controlled mass media, in presenting the anti-NGO campaign to 
the public. According to media reports, Kostantin Kosachev, head of the Federation 
Council’s Committee for Foreign Affairs and the main sponsor of the bill, publicly 
accused the West of using NGOs for promoting revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia 
(Gorbachev 2015). He stated that “Americans and their allies don’t hide that Russia is 
next,” adding that foreign NGOs should be controlled “in order not to repeat another 
defeat of the country and the nation” (Gorbachev, 2015:2).  
In the following years, anti-Americanism became a pillar of the Kremlin’s 
ideology. Putin’s rhetoric was more and more focused on the ideological struggle 
between the Russian civilization and its way of life and a hostile, aggressive United 
States:   
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Putin’s speeches were full of hostility, lashing out at the West for betraying 
its promises, for treating Russia like a defeated ‘vassal’ rather than a great 
country, for an inability to distinguish between right and wrong. He 
denounced the United States for its behavior in Hiroshima and Vietnam, 
Iraq and Afghanistan, the Balkans and Libya. He cut off adoptions to 
America, claiming that ‘our’ babies were being abused by cruel and 
heedless foreigners. The West was hypocritical, arrogant, self-righteous, 
and dissolute, according to Putin, so he strengthened his alliance with the 
Russian Orthodox Church to reestablish “traditional Russian values” 
(Remnic, 2014).   
 
Since 2012, coverage of the United States by Russian state-controlled mass media 
fully corresponded with the Kremlin’s increasingly anti-American rhetoric. State-
controlled television stations were repeatedly talking about the “treachery of Russian 
liberals and American manipulations” (Remnic, 2014).   
Dmitry Kiselev, the head of recently created news agency Russia Today, and the 
host of a popular Sunday night show “Vesti Nedeli” (News of the Week), spearheaded 
the propaganda efforts. Remnic (2014), who called Kiselev “a masterly, and 
unapologetic, purveyor of the Kremlin line” described his attacks against the United 
States on Russian television:       
With his theatrical hand gestures and brilliantly insinuating intonation, he 
tells his viewers that Russia is the only country in the world that can turn 
the U.S. into ‘radioactive dust,’ that the anti-gay-propaganda laws are 
insufficiently strict, and that Ukraine is not a real country but merely 
‘virtual’…. He tells his viewers that, in Ukraine, fascists abound, the U.S. 
State Department underwrites revolutions, and ‘life is not worth a single 
kopeck’ (Remnic, 2014).    
 
Accusations against the United States of scheming against Russian interests, 
initiating and supporting the revolution and civil war in Ukraine, and imperialistic 
ambitions of world domination became a mainstream framework in state-controlled mass 
media.  
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State-run television became a key factor in the Kremlin’s strategy to foster anti-
Western attitudes among the Russian public. Birnbaum (2015) argued that state-
controlled mass media, with television as its dominant force, were promoting the image 
of Russian as a nation under attack by skillfully mixing facts with biased opinion in their 
coverage for the clear purpose of moving the public mindset.    
Sabrina Tavernise of the New York Times provided an accurate description of the 
extent of anti-Americanism in Russian broadcasting in 2015:   
“Independent voices are all but gone from Russian television and most 
channels now march to the same, slickly produced beat. Virtually any 
domestic problem, from rubles decline to pensioners losing subsidies and 
public transport, is cast as a geopolitical stand-off between Russia and 
America, and political unrest anywhere is portrayed as having an American 
state department official lurking behind it” (Tavernise, 2015). 
  
By 2015, state-controlled mass media had been turned into an effective 
propaganda machine, and anti-Americanism was one of its driving components.  
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Chapter 5  
Results of the Study  
Public opinion analysis: dimensions of anti-Americanism is Russia  
Anti-Americanism in Russia was examined by applying various methods of 
statistical analysis to the data from a survey conducted in Russia by the Pew Research 
Center in 2012. The dataset from the 2012 survey wave was chosen because it was the only 
recent survey that allowed comparison with research conducted by Chiozza (2010). Both 
Pew surveys included not only questions about respondents’ attitudes towards the United 
States and the American people, but also focused on various aspects of American culture 
and influence, such as cultural norms, economic regulations, foreign policy, etc. 
In order to investigate peculiarities of public attitudes held by the Russian public 
towards various aspects of the United States, the author used descriptive statistics, and 
conducted factor analysis, regression modeling, and cluster analysis in order to detect 
structural patterns and evaluate relationships between variables. All of the data analysis 
was conducted in SPSS. Other methods, such as cross-tabs and correlations, were also used 
to further analyze the data.  
Table 1 displays the opinion of all of the Russian respondents towards the United 
States and the American people in 2012. The Pew poll included two separate questions 
(“opinion about the United States” and “opinion about Americans”) focused on the United 
States. Although Pew Research Center did not provide operationalization of the terms 
“United States” and “Americans” or differences between them, we can suggest that the 
term “United States” was used to study respondents’ attitudes towards the U.S. 
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government, leadership, and policies while “Americans” referred to the people living in 
the United States.   
A majority (52.6%) of respondents held positive views (“very favorable” and 
“somewhat favorable” answers combined) about the United States, and 34.4% expressed 
negative opinion. The Russian respondents demonstrated their basic friendly attitude 
towards the American people: 63.9% held positive views, and only 24.2% expressed 
negative views.       
The views of the Russian public about the United States in 2012 generally 
corresponded with the global trend. As seen in Table 2, data from the same survey 
conducted by Pew Global in 20 countries (Brazil, Britain, China, Czech Republic, Egypt, 
France, Germany, Greece, India, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Mexico, Pakistan, Poland, 
Spain, Tunisia, Turkey, and the United States) world-wide showed that the attitudes of the 
Russian respondents towards the United States and its people was slightly higher than 
average across other surveyed countries. In comparison to global trends at that time, the 
Russian public mindset could be described as moderately pro-American.  
Table 3 included answers of Russian respondents to a variety of soft power 
questions about the United States, its people and culture. Nye (2004) defined soft power as 
the ability of a state to get the desired outcome through attraction rather than coercion or 
payments. In the Pew survey, soft power was measured by asking respondents about their 
attitudes towards American scientific advances, popular culture, ideas about democracy, 
ways of doing business and spread of American customs in Russia.   
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Table 1. Attitudes of respondents in Russia towards the United States and the American 
people. Pew Global Attitudes survey, 2012.  
 Q8A. Please tell me if you 
have a very favorable, 
somewhat favorable, 
somewhat unfavorable or 
very unfavorable opinion 
of the United States? 
Q8B. Please tell me if you 
have a very favorable, 
somewhat favorable, 
somewhat unfavorable or 
very unfavorable opinion 
of Americans? 
Very favorable 11.3 12.7 
Somewhat favorable 41.3 51.2 
Somewhat unfavorable 25.2 18.7 
Very unfavorable 9.2 5.5 
Don't know 11.7 10.7 
Refused 1.3 1.2 
 
Table 2. Attitudes of respondents in 21 countries towards the United States and the 
American people. Pew Global Attitudes survey, 2012.  
 Q8A. Please tell me if you 
have a very favorable, 
somewhat favorable, 
somewhat unfavorable or 
very unfavorable opinion 
of the United States? 
Q8B. Please tell me if you 
have a very favorable, 
somewhat favorable, 
somewhat unfavorable or 
very unfavorable opinion 
of Americans? 
Very favorable 12.5 12.8 
Somewhat favorable 35.7 39.3 
Somewhat unfavorable 22.0 21.4 
Very unfavorable 18.4 15.3 
Don't know 10.3 9.9 
Refused 1.2 1.4 
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Table 3. Attitudes of respondents in Russia towards various aspects of American soft 
power. Pew Global Attitudes survey, 2012. 
 Q54. 
American 
ideas and 
customs 
spreading in 
Russia  
Q55. 
American 
ideas about 
democracy 
Q56. 
American 
ways of 
doing 
business 
Q57. 
American 
music, 
movies and 
television 
Q58. 
American 
technological 
and scientific 
advances 
Positive 
attitude  
20.2 26.9 33.8 49.5 34.2 
Negative 
attitude  
67.9 52.5 41.1 42.3 48.9 
Don’t 
know  
11.5 20.1 24.9 7.5 15.9 
Refused  0.4 0.5 0.2 0.7 1.0 
 
 Table 4. Attitudes of respondents in 21 countries towards various aspects of 
American soft power. Pew Global Attitudes survey, 2012. 
 Q54. 
American 
ideas and 
customs 
spreading in 
Russia  
Q55. 
American 
ideas about 
democracy 
Q56. 
American 
ways of 
doing 
business 
Q57. 
American 
music, 
movies and 
television 
Q58. 
American 
technological 
and scientific 
advances 
Positive 
attitude  
28.9 41.0 40.0 47.6 63.7 
Negative 
attitude  
56.6 42.3 41.2 39.7 23.1 
Don’t 
know  
9.6 11.5 13.6 7.6 8.1 
Refused  1.1 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.2 
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Comparison between answers to questions related to American soft power in Russia (Table 
3) and across the globe in 2012 (Table 4) demonstrated similarities and distinctions 
between views of the global and Russian public.  
Russian popular opinion about issues related to American soft power (or 
“dimensions of America” in Chiozza’s terminology) generally also followed global trends. 
The Russians, as well as the global public, embraced American popular culture and 
technological and scientific advances. The notion of American cultural imperialism (table 
4, Q54 “American ideas and customs spreading in Russia”) was perceived negatively by 
majority of respondents both in Russia and across the 21 countries surveyed by Pew. 
As seen in the Tables 1 and 3, the Russian public in 2012 mostly held neutral to 
moderately positive attitudes towards the United States and its people. Their attitudes 
towards different displays of American soft power (with an exception of American music, 
movies and television) were much more negative, and more negative than views of 
respondents in other countries.   
The results of this study confirmed the notion that views about the United States in 
Russia are indeed a complicated and multi-dimensional phenomenon. The data 
demonstrated the multi-faceted nature of the attitudes of the Russian public towards the 
United States. These findings supported Chiozza’s (2010) dimensions of America theory. 
Chiozza stressed the multidimensional nature of foreign public’s views of the United 
States, incorporating sometimes conflicting views on various aspects of the United States 
and its actions. According to the theory, opinion of foreign publics towards the United 
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States “takes a loose and multi-faceted form, in which negative and positive elements 
coexist with no apparent tension” (Chiozza, p. 4). 
The data demonstrated that, in accordance to Chiozza’s dimensions of America 
theory, large sections of population in Russia held simultaneously positive and negative 
attitudes towards various dimensions of United States, its culture and influence.  
The aggregated respondent’s answers to survey questions described above provided 
useful information about general attitudes of the Russian public towards the United States 
and its people and culture, but also presented additional questions.  
First, what was it about their attitudes towards the United States that changed so 
drastically from the spring 2012 to January 2015, when the number of Russians holding 
negative feelings about the U.S. reached 81%? What was it about the attitudes and mindset 
of the Russian public that facilitated and allowed such a drastic increase in anti-American 
feelings?  
And second, how much influence did attitudes towards other issues, people and 
events have on Russians’ views about the United States? Additional statistical testing and 
analysis was performed in order to answers these questions and provide insights into the 
mindset of the Russian public in regards to the United States.   
 
Factor analysis  
According to Hill & Lewicki (2005), factor analysis is a statistical method used to 
(1) reduce the number of variables and (2) detect structure within the relationships between 
variables, that is, to classify variables. Factor analysis is focused on seeking out joint 
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variations in response to unobserved variables, also called factors. This method describes 
variability between correlated variables, focusing on extracting fewer unabsorbed 
underlying variables and reducing the number of variables for better interpretation.  
In this study, factor analysis was employed to extract factors (unobserved variables) 
among the following variables representing attitudes of the respondents in Russia towards 
the United States, its people and various aspects of American culture and influence:    
Q8.  Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat 
unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of (INSERT)?  
a) The United States  
b) Americans  
Q54.  Which of the following phrases comes closer to your view?  It’s good that 
American ideas and customs are spreading here, OR it’s bad that American ideas and 
customs are spreading here.   
Q55.  And which of these comes closer to your view?  I like American ideas about 
democracy, OR I dislike American ideas about democracy.   
Q56.  Which comes closer to describing your view?  I like American ways of 
doing business, OR I dislike American ways of doing business.   
Q57.  Which is closer to describing your view? I like American music, movies 
and television, OR I dislike American music, movies and television.   
Q58.  And which comes closer to describing your view?  I admire the United 
States for its technological and scientific advances, OR I do not admire the United States 
for its technological and scientific advances.   
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In accordance with the approach taken by Chiozza (2010), the variables describing 
public attitudes towards various aspects of American culture and influence were 
transformed into binary variables. The greater or lesser degree of negative attitude to a 
certain aspect of American influence was coded 1, while all other options (including 
positive attitude) were coded as 0.  
Principal components factor analysis (as suggested by Hill & Lewick, 2005), 
including varimax factor rotation, produced two factors that explained 56% of the variance. 
In other words, the underlying factors explained more than half of the variance of the 
different aspects of attitudes towards the U.S. and its culture. The relevant factor loadings 
(i.e. correlations between variable and the two factors) were presented in the following 
table. 
Table 5 showed that respondent’s attitudes towards the United States and 
Americans were highly correlated amongst themselves, and all the soft power questions 
were highly intercorrelated amongst themselves. At the same time, correlations between 
the two types of questions was comparatively small. 
Thus, factor analysis showed that there were two relatively independent factors: 
attitude towards the U.S. and Americans (the second factor) and the attitudes towards other 
aspects of American influence (the first factor). The first factor was marked by high 
loadings on the American soft power questions, the second factor was marked by high 
loadings on the attitude towards the U.S. and the American people. Contribution of 
variables q8a and q8b to the first factor, as well as of variables q54-q58 to the second was 
relatively small. 
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Table 5. Factor loadings in factor analysis, data from the survey conducted in Russia. Pew 
Global Attitudes survey, 2012.     
Variables  Factor Loadings 
1 2 
Attitudes towards the United States (q8a)  .201 .882 
Attitudes towards American people (q8b) .153 .896 
Attitude towards spread of American ideas 
and customs in Russia (q54) 
.679 .189 
Attitude towards American ideas about 
democracy (q55) 
.741 .170 
Attitudes towards American ways of doing 
business  (q56) 
.722 .118 
Attitudes towards American music, movies 
and television  (q57) 
.540 .147 
Attitudes towards the United States for its 
technological and scientific advances (q58) 
.612 .059 
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This meant that the respondent’s answers to questions about Americans and the 
United States were interconnected: if a respondent had a negative view of the people, he or 
she would tend to have negative views on the United States. At the same time, if a 
respondent expressed negative views about one aspect of American culture, he or she 
would tend to have negative views about all other aspects of American soft power. This 
logic was proven to work with both negative and positive views.  
However, there were no statistically significant correlation between the two factors. 
Positive or negative attitudes towards American music, art, movies or any other aspects of 
American soft power could be combined with the either like or dislike for the United States 
and its citizens.  
Other methods of statistical analysis, which will be discussed further, confirmed 
the results of factor analysis. 
 
Regression analysis 
The purpose of the multiple regression analysis, according to Hill & Lewicki 
(2005), is to “is to analyze the relationship between several independent or predictor 
variables and a dependent or criterion variable.” 
The multiple regression analysis was used in this research project to study the 
relationship between the dependent variable “attitude towards the United States” (variable 
Q8a in a binary form) and a number of independent variables, i.e. to find out which of the 
other survey questions reflecting respondents’ attitudes on a number of domestic and 
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foreign issues have better predictive power in regards to their attitude towards the United 
States.   
In addition to variables that measure various aspects related to dimensions of 
America, this analysis incorporated more than a dozen variables that measured the attitudes 
of the respondents in Russia towards various aspects of public life, domestic and foreign 
policy. All of them, apart from demographics, have been transformed into binary variables, 
where various degrees of negative assessments were reduced to 1, and all positive to 0. The 
variable “age” was transformed into a variable with three gradations: youth (18-29), middle 
age (30-59) and older (60 and older). The variable “education” had 8 answer options, in 
accordance with the different levels of education adopted in Russia. 
When variable Q8b (attitudes towards the American people) was incorporated into 
a set of independent variables, the Nagelkerke coefficient (an analogue to squared 
correlation coefficient in the standard regression analysis for interval variables) was 0.58. 
A set of independent variables, beta coefficients of which were significant at the 
0.95 confidence interval, was presented in the following table.  
Where the variables Q54-55 were described above, and Q2, RUS4, and Q92 were 
the following: 
Q2 Overall, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way things are going in 
our country today?  
RUS4 Which statement comes closer to your own views, even if neither is exactly 
right? Russia is as respected around the world as it should be OR Russia should be more 
respected around the world than it is?    
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Table 6. Results of the regression analysis including variable “attitudes towards the 
American people,” data from the survey conducted in Russia. Pew Global Attitudes survey, 
2012.     
Variable 
Beta 
coefficient  
Significance 
level   
Attitude towards spread of American ideas and customs 
in Russia (q54) 
.576 .024 
Attitude towards American ideas about democracy (q55) .630 .006 
Satisfaction with the way things are going in Russia today 
(q2) 
.674 .001 
Views on whether Russia is respected around the world 
as it should be (rus4) 
.619 .010 
Overall approval of the international policies of President 
Barack Obama (q92) 
.883 .000 
Attitudes towards American people (q8b) 3.537 .000 
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Q92 Overall, do you approve or disapprove of the international policies of 
President Barack Obama?  
In the table above the positive regression coefficient of the variable Q2 was worth 
noticing. Those respondents who believed that things in Russia were going in the right 
direction in 2012 were not more, but to a lesser extent prone to anti-Americanism. In other 
words, those who did not like the policy of the Kremlin, did not like America either. 
As it can be seen from Table 6, attitudes towards the American people was the best 
predictor of the attitude towards the United States. Variable Q8b had the largest value of 
the beta coefficient, significantly exceeding the coefficients of the remaining variables. 
It is also interesting, however, to mention variables that were not included into the 
model because of the low significance of their beta coefficients. Those variables included 
demographics (age and education), and attitudes towards Putin, who in 2012 was just 
elected for a third term as president.  
The regression model, where the variable describing the attitudes towards 
American people was excluded, produced somewhat different picture. In this model, the 
explanatory power of the model is markedly reduced, the Nagelkerke coefficient was only 
0.32. The list of variables with significant beta coefficients are presented in the following 
table.  
Compared with the previous model two additional variables were added:  
Q40a Now I’m going to read a list of political leaders.  For each, tell me how 
much confidence you have in each leader to do the right thing regarding world affairs – a 
lot of confidence, some confidence, not too much confidence, or no confidence at all? 
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Table 7. Results of the regression analysis excluding variable “attitudes towards the 
American people,” data from the survey conducted in Russia. Pew Global Attitudes survey, 
2012. 
Variable Beta 
coefficient  
Significance 
level   
Attitude towards spread of American ideas and 
customs in Russia (q54) 
.859 .000 
Attitude towards American ideas about democracy 
(q55) 
.656 .000 
Satisfaction with the way things are going in 
Russia today (q2)  
.490 .004 
Views on whether Russia is respected around the 
world as it should be (rus4) 
.362 .056 
Overall approval of the international policies of 
President Barack Obama (q92) 
.804 .000 
Confidence in Barack Obama to do the right thing 
regarding world affairs (q40a) 
.423 .010 
Position on the statement “Most elected officials 
care what people like me think” (q68a) 
.570 .002 
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From a list of politicians only option Q40a – “Barack Obama” was used for this analysis.   
Q68a Please tell me whether you completely agree, mostly agree, mostly disagree 
or completely disagree with the following statement: Most elected officials care what 
people like me think.  
In the model that excluded attitudes towards the American people (Table 7) 
respondents’ attitudes towards the spread of American ideas and customs in Russia had the 
highest predictor power. The explanatory power of the model, however, was reduced from 
Nagelkerke coefficient 0.58 to 0.32.  
The last variable from the list above (attitudes towards elected officials) presented 
a paradoxical phenomenon. The coefficient of the corresponding variable was positive. 
This meant that those respondents who did not believe that the majority of elected officials 
in Russia care about what people like the respondent think, were more likely to have 
negative attitude towards America than those who hold the opposite opinion. In other 
words, those who poorly evaluated elected officials in Russia, poorly assessed the United 
States as well.  
This paradox was partly explained by the results of the cluster analysis displayed in 
Table 8. 
 
Cluster analysis 
Cluster analysis is a statistical method used for grouping objects of similar kinds 
into categories. According to Hill & Lewicki (2005), this method “is an exploratory data 
analysis tool which aims at sorting different objects into groups in a way that the degree of 
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association between two objects is maximal if they belong to the same group and minimal 
otherwise” (p. 115). 
In the context of this research project, cluster analysis was used to separate 
respondents into groups (or clusters) based on their answers to a number of questions 
concerning the United States and its soft power. In the results, each cluster contained 
respondents who held similar views of the United States, i.e. answers of respondents within 
a cluster were more similar to each other rather than to those of respondents in other 
clusters.     
Variables q8a, q8b, q54-58, describing the attitudes towards the various aspects of 
American influence, were used in the cluster analysis. They were transformed into the 
ternary form: negative attitude was coded as “-1”, positive attitude as “1”, any other attitude 
as “0”. The method of k-means clustering with four clusters was used. Average values of 
variables in the respective clusters are presented in the following table. 
The first cluster includes 26% of the respondents, the second 19%, the third 27%, 
the fourth 28%.  
The first cluster can be called “consistently anti-American.” Among respondents 
from this cluster the balance of positive and negative assessments of the United States was 
-69%, while the balance of positive and negative attitudes towards American people was -
38%. At the same time, representatives of the cluster dislike not only the United States and 
American people, but they also held very negative views about everything American. For 
example, the question about the spread of American ideas and customs to Russia had a   
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Table 8. Results of the cluster analysis, data from the survey conducted in Russia. Pew 
Global Attitudes survey, 2012. 
Variables  
 Cluster 
1 
 Cluster 
2 
Cluster 
3 
Cluster 
4 
Attitude towards the United States (q8a)  -.69 -.70 +.85 +.95 
Attitude towards American people (q8b) -.38 -.12 +.93 +.95 
Attitude towards spread of American 
ideas and customs in Russia (q54) 
-.92 -.75 +.47 -.80 
Attitude towards American ideas about 
democracy (q55) 
-.78 -.52 +.59 -.42 
Attitude towards American ways of doing 
business (q56) 
-.59 -.14 +.57 -.17 
Attitude towards American music, movies 
and television  (q57)  
-.95 +.81 +.85 -.25 
Attitude towards the United States for its 
technological and scientific advances 
(q58) 
-.61 -.33 +.47 -.20 
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balance of -92%, while the question about attitudes towards American culture (music, 
movies and television) had a balance of -95%.  
The second cluster can be described as “moderately anti-American.” However, the 
moderation of their anti-American views is relative, since the level of the negative attitude 
towards the United States in this group was similar to the first cluster. The level of 
negativity towards the spread of American ideas and customs was also very high (-75%), 
although less than in the first cluster. Attitudes towards other dimensions of America in 
this group was less negative than in the consistent anti-American group. But the most 
striking difference was found in attitudes towards American movies, music and television. 
Almost all members of this group demonstrated positive attitudes towards American 
popular culture (+81%). Their attitudes can be summarized in the following statement: 
“We do not love America, but we love Hollywood. But only Hollywood.”  
The members of the third cluster are “consistently pro-American,” complete 
opposite of the first cluster. Almost all members of this group like the United States 
(+85%), and even more of them harbor good feelings towards the American people 
(+93%). These people also expressed positive feelings towards all other kinds of American 
culture and influence - technology, democracy, the ways of doing business, popular culture. 
The least popular items for the respondents in this group were the spread of American ideas 
and customs in Russia (+47%), and American science and technology (+47%). However, 
as the table 8 demonstrated, even these two aspects of American influence were viewed by 
the consistently pro-American respondents in relatively positive way.    
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The fourth cluster was the most intriguing one. It can be described as “paradoxical 
pro-American”. Members of this cluster are even more sympathetic towards the United 
States and the American people than people from the consistently pro-American group 
(+95% and +95% respectively). However, their attitudes towards all other aspects of the 
American culture and outreach is definitely negative. These respondents were particularly 
negative towards the notion of American cultural imperialism, i.e. the spread American 
ideas and customs in Russia (-80%).  
In order to gain additional insight into the mindset of all the clusters of respondents, 
cross-tabs between clusters and answers to other questions from the survey are provided in 
Table 9, 10 and 11. Several questions on the survey, including respondent’s views on 
domestic Russian affairs, provided important information about their worldviews and 
beliefs. 
Based on the suggestions of some experts, for example Shlapentokh (2011), about 
the nature of modern anti-Americanism in Russia, i.e. that it has been artificially inflated 
by elites and the Russian authorities for the purpose of boosting public support of their 
policies, those respondents who supported Russian authorities and were satisfied with the 
way things were going in Russian would likely hold stronger anti-American convictions, 
while people opposed to Russian authorities would be more pro-American.   
Table 9, however, demonstrates that these assumptions were disproved by the 
survey data analysis. In 2012, a majority of respondents from both clusters of those 
consistently and those moderately anti-American clusters (clusters 1 and 2) were 
dissatisfied with the way things were going in Russia. At the same time, respondents who 
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viewed the United States in a more positive way (clusters 3 and 4) expressed their 
satisfaction with the direction the country was going.  
Analysis of respondents’ attitudes towards the re-election of Vladimir Putin in 
March 2012 produced results consistent with the previous table. The return of Putin to the 
Kremlin was greeted with more enthusiasm by people who expressed positive views about 
the United States, while those who held anti-American views were less satisfied with 
election results.  
Results of the cluster analysis showed that those who supported President Putin 
personally and were satisfied with the way things were going in Russia held more positive 
views of the United States than those who were less supportive of Putin.  This is contrary 
to expectations of the traditional explanation for anti-Americanism in Russia as mostly 
being a result of manipulation by Putin and his administration in 2012. 
 
Anti-Americanism and age of respondents  
The data analysis showed that in 2012 anti-American views were expressed to some 
extent by people across different age groups in Russia. According to the data, the younger 
population was slightly more likely to have pro-American views, while the older 
generation, was more likely to harbor negative attitudes towards everything American.  
As Table 11 demonstrated, the consistently anti-American cluster had the largest 
proportion of elderly people and the lowest proportion of young people. The pro-American 
cluster had the highest proportion of young people - almost 40%.  
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Table 9. Cross-tab between clusters and question “Overall, are you satisfied or dissatisfied 
with the way things are going in our country today?” (% in cluster). Data from the survey 
conducted in Russia. Pew Global Attitudes survey, 2012. 
 Q2.  Overall, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with 
the way things are going in our country today? 
Satisfied Dissatisfied Don't 
know 
Refused 
Cluster  1 39.2% 53.1% 7.7%  
2 36.6% 54.5% 7.9% 1.0% 
3 47.6% 37.7% 14.7%  
4 55.8% 38.0% 5.8% 0.4% 
Total 45.6% 45.0% 9.1% 0.3% 
 
Table 10. Cross-tab between clusters and question “Overall, were you satisfied or 
dissatisfied with the results of the March 4th Presidential elections?” (% in cluster). Data 
from the survey conducted in Russia. Pew Global Attitudes survey, 2012. 
 RUS1. Overall, were you satisfied or dissatisfied 
with the results of the March 4th Presidential 
elections? 
Satisfied Dissatisfied Don't 
know 
Refused 
Cluster 1 54.2% 37.3% 8.1% 0.4% 
2 50.3% 32.5% 15.7% 1.6% 
3 56.0% 31.1% 12.5% 0.4% 
4 63.4% 31.2% 5.1% 0.4% 
Total  56.5% 33.0% 9.9% 0.6% 
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It is important to note that among the moderately anti-American respondents a third 
were younger people, 18 to 29 year olds.  
However, regression analysis demonstrated that the age variable had to be excluded 
from the model because of the low significance of beta coefficients. One cannot, based on 
this data, claim that age had a strong effect on respondents’ attitudes towards the United 
States.  
In order to further test the relationship between two variables (attitudes towards the 
United States and age of respondents) correlation analyses was performed. Correlation 
analysis measures the strength of the relationship between the two variables (source). The 
statistical testing included three standard correlation coefficients (Pearson’s r Correlation, 
Kendall’s Tau, and Spearman’s rho rank), all of which measure the strength of association 
between two variables.  
As seen in the Table 13, the Pearson’s r correlation between attitudes towards the 
United States and respondent’s age was -.149. According to suggested estimates for 
interpreting strengths of correlations, r in the range from -.01 to -.19 can be interpreted as 
no or negligible relationship. Kendall’s Tau and Spearman’s rho coefficients also 
confirmed that association between age and attitudes towards the United States was 
statistically weak.  These results, combined with the regression analysis, demonstrated a 
weak association between the age of respondents and their attitudes towards the United 
States.  
Interpretation of these results means that, contrary to an opinion expressed by 
various experts, it would be a mistake to think that anti-Americanism is Russia was  
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Table 11. Cross-tab between attitudes towards the United States and age group. Data from 
the survey conducted in Russia. Pew Global Attitudes survey, 2012. 
 Age group Total  
18-29 30-59 60+ 
Attitude 
towards 
U.S. 
Negative  29.5% 33.3% 44.2% 34.4% 
Neutral  10.2% 10.8% 22.6% 13.0% 
Positive  60.4% 55.9% 33.2% 52.6% 
 
Table 12. Cross-tab between clusters and age groups. Data from the survey conducted in 
Russia. Pew Global Attitudes survey, 2012. 
 Age 
18-29 30-59 60+ 
Cluster  1 13.8% 48.5% 37.7% 
2 33.0% 51.3% 15.7% 
3 39.6% 51.6% 8.8% 
4 24.6% 58.3% 17.0% 
Total 27.5% 52.6% 19.9% 
 
Table 13. Correlation analyses between attitudes towards the United States and age of 
respondents. Data from the survey conducted in Russia. Pew Global Attitudes survey, 
2012. 
Correlation Coefficient age_3 
Pearson’s r  -.149 
Kendall’s Tau  -.138 
Spearman’s (rho) rank -.152 
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confined within an older population who were born, raised and lived adult lives in the 
Soviet Union.  
 
Dimensions of popular Anti-Americanism in Russia: conclusions  
In summary of the results of the Pew data analysis, one sees first that more than 
half of the respondents (52.6%) in 2012 held positive attitudes towards the United States, 
while about a third (34.4%) held negative views. The levels of pro-American attitudes in 
Russia were slightly higher than the world average, according to the same Pew poll. The 
respondents’ attitudes towards various aspects of American soft power (with an exception 
of American pop culture) were mostly negative, and were worse than the global average. 
In accordance to Chiozza’s dimensions of America theory, large sections of the Russian 
respondents held simultaneously positive and negative attitudes towards various 
dimensions of United States, its culture and influence.    
The results of additional statistical analysis provided an important insight into the 
mindset of the Russian public and its views about the United States.  
First, factor analysis produced two hidden factors, and demonstrated that attitudes 
towards the United States and its people were inter-correlated, but independent from 
respondents’ evaluations of American soft power. Various aspects of American soft power 
(business practices, popular culture, science and technology, ideas about democracy and 
spread of American customs in Russia) were interrelated, but independent from 
respondent’s attitudes towards the country in general and its people. Testing the soft power 
thesis in Russia showed that there was no strong relationship between respondents’ 
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attitudes towards American soft power and their evaluation about the country. Results from 
Russia differ from Chiozza’s world-wide results from 2002 Pew global poll. Interpretation 
of these results and implications of the soft power theory in Russia are discussed in details 
in the following chapter.     
The multiple regression analysis was performed in order to find out what other 
variables had the most predictive power on respondents’ views about the United States. 
The analysis demonstrated that respondents’ attitudes towards the American people was 
the best predictor for their attitudes towards the United States in general. When the attitude 
towards the American people was excluded from the model, the attitudes towards the 
spread of American ideas and customs in Russia had the highest predictor power. The 
explanatory power of the model, however, was significantly reduced. It is also important 
to note that neither age, nor attitudes towards Putin had a significant predictive power over 
respondents’ attitudes towards the United States. According to the results, respondents who 
were negative towards Putin and his policies were more prone to express anti-American 
views. 
Cluster analysis was used to separate respondents into clusters with similar answers 
to a number of questions about the United States, its people and its soft power. Cluster 
analysis produced four clusters, including consistent/moderate anti-American (26% and 
19%) and consistent/paradoxical pro-American attitudes (27% and 28%). While these first 
two clusters that expressed anti-American views displayed traits that were expected based 
on previous research on anti-Americanism in Russia, the pro-American clusters presented 
some unexpected results. First, respondents in both of the pro-American clusters displayed 
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higher levels of support for Putin, his policies and the direction that the country was going 
than the anti-American respondents. Second, respondents from the forth (so-called 
paradoxical pro-American cluster) expressed positive views attitudes towards the United 
States and its people and highly negative attitudes towards very aspect of the American 
power. 
The implications and possible interpretations of these results are discussed in detail 
in the following chapter of the dissertation. It is important, however, to stress that the in-
depth analysis of mass public opinion about the United States and all of the aspects of its 
influences in Russia produced results that significantly differ from the research conducted 
in other countries, and to some extent is counterintuitive to assumptions popular both in 
academic circles and the expert community.  
These results demonstrate the complexity and uniqueness of the relationship 
between the Russian public and the United States, and stresses the need for additional 
research and interpretation.      
 
Anti-Americanism, trust and use of mass media   
 Data provided by the Levada Center was used to study relations between media 
use, trust for mass media and the level of anti-Americanism among the Russian public. The 
data covered a period from May 2011 to July 2015.  
Tables 14-18 are a cross-tab between respondents’ attitudes towards the United 
States and their main sources of information about events in the country.  
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Table 14. Respondents’ attitudes towards the U.S. and their main sources of information. 
Data from the survey conducted in Russia. The Levada Center, 2015. 
  
What is your main source of information about events 
in the country?  
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July 2015 
Number of respondents  1602 1359 394 627 13 114 14 175 369 
Very positive  2.7 2.3 2.4 2.3 5.2 3.1 0 2.6 4 
Mostly positive  16.2 14.6 15.7 18 38 11.7 9.7 18.8 16.7 
Mostly negative  38.9 39 34.6 41.9 39.7 40.6 11.6 44.9 37.6 
Very negative  31.2 33.3 38 28 4.9 30.1 61.5 25.4 31.3 
Don’t know  11 10.8 9.4 9.8 12.2 14.6 17.2 8.3 10.4 
January 2015  
In general, what is your attitude towards the United States today?  
Number of respondents  806 701 207 301 5 67 9 52 220 
Very positive  1.7 1.3 3.1 2.9 0 0 0 0 1.1 
Mostly positive  10.6 9.6 7.3 14.1 29.6 10.5 16.7 22.6 7.3 
Mostly negative  41.8 41.1 40.4 41.6 59.3 49.2 48.5 36.6 47.7 
Very negative  39.3 41.9 40.6 35.2 11.1 40.1 34.8 38.9 38.1 
Don’t know  6.6 6.2 8.6 6.1 0 0.1 0 1.8 5.8 
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Table 15. Respondents’ attitudes towards the U.S. and their main sources of information. 
Data from the survey conducted in Russia. The Levada Center, 2014. 
  
What is your main source of information about 
events in the country?  
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September 2014  
Number of respondents 
160
0 
134
6 
494 568 17 107 14 181 406 
In general, what is your attitude towards the United States today? 
Very positive  1.1 1 1.6 0.8 10.6 1 13.1 0.8 0.8 
Mostly positive  15.9 13.6 14.3 21.2 7 22.1 0 20.2 15.7 
Mostly negative  42.5 43.5 42 41.8 32.9 42 19.1 38.5 43.7 
Very negative  30.2 32.3 30.5 25.6 47.3 28.8 63.2 34.1 28.1 
Don’t know  10.3 9.5 11.7 10.6 2.2 6.2 4.6 6.4 11.7 
March 2014  
Number of respondents 793 707 184 287 12 61 5 60 197 
In general, what is your attitude towards the United States today? 
Very positive  2 1.8 1 3.8 0 0.4 0 0 2.4 
Mostly positive  32.3 31.4 27.1 35.1 64.3 24.7 15.7 50.4 37 
Mostly negative  43.5 44.7 47.1 42.8 35.7 56.6 84.3 20.2 35.9 
Very negative  12.1 11.9 12.5 10.5 0 7.8 0 17.6 11.7 
Don’t know  10.1 10.2 12.3 7.8 0 10.4 0 11.8 12.9 
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Table 16. Respondents’ attitudes towards the U.S. and their main sources of information. 
Data from the survey conducted in Russia. The Levada Center, 2013. 
  
What is your main source of information about 
events in the country?  
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November 2013 
Number of respondents 
160
3 
136
6 
502 546 29 125 21 149 313 
In general, what is your attitude towards the United States today? 
Very positive  4.3 3.5 4.7 4.5 2.4 5.1 5.8 3.5 5.1 
Mostly positive  33.1 33.1 33.8 37 39.7 23.2 53.7 40.4 27.3 
Mostly negative  35.2 36.8 34.6 34.3 31.5 47.1 21.7 29.8 40 
Very negative  14 14.1 14.8 12.1 12.5 16.6 10.1 15.4 11.9 
Don’t know  13.4 12.6 12 12.1 13.8 8 8.8 10.9 15.6 
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Table 17. Respondents’ attitudes towards the U.S. and their main sources of information. 
Data from the survey conducted in Russia. The Levada Center, 2012. 
  
What is your main source of information about 
events in the country?  
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March 2012 
Number of respondents 
163
3 
139
1 
792 459 23 167 19 105 203 
In general, what is your attitude towards the United States today? 
Very positive  4.3 3.5 4 6.3 15.3 0.8 9.3 4.2 5 
Mostly positive  46.2 45.6 42.5 52 34.9 44.4 58.7 62.2 46.6 
Mostly negative  27 27.9 29.4 24.5 16.6 30.6 16.5 21.8 20.8 
Very negative  7.5 7.8 8.2 6 8.6 5.6 7.8 6.4 9 
Don’t know  14.9 15.2 15.9 11.2 24.5 18.5 7.7 5.4 18.6 
January 2012 
Number of respondents 
151
9 
132
3 
738 366 12 131 10 131 237 
In general, what is your attitude towards the United States today? 
Very positive  2.5 1.8 2.5 3 6.3 1.4 -- 5.8 0.6 
Mostly positive  41.9 41.3 41.2 51.2 36.8 43.4 38.6 35.4 39.5 
Mostly negative  31.1 32 31.1 25.3 16.2 36.4 7.6 29.3 36.1 
Very negative  9.1 9.4 9.5 7.1 21.6 13.2 7.6 10.4 8.9 
Don’t know  15.5 15.5 15.7 13.4 19.1 5.6 46.3 19.1 14.9 
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Table 18. Respondents’ attitudes towards the U.S. and their main sources of information. 
Data from the survey conducted in Russia. The Levada Center, 2011. 
  
What is your main source of information about 
events in the country?  
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July 2011 
Number of respondents 
160
0 
146
1 
768 319 23 210 21 169 158 
In general, what is your attitude towards the United States today? 
Very positive  5.1 4.8 5.2 7 14 3.9 11 4.3 3.1 
Mostly positive  53.7 53.4 52.2 60.5 58.8 47.5 29.8 57.5 58.2 
Mostly negative  22.5 22.5 25.1 18.3 17.3 22.9 42.8 20.2 17.7 
Very negative  6.3 6.5 5.9 5.5 6.5 8 6.4 6 9.3 
Don’t know  12.4 12.8 11.6 8.8 3.4 17.6 10.1 12 11.7 
May 2011 
Number of respondents 
160
0 
144
8 
718 339 29 159 14 152 239 
In general, what is your attitude towards the United States today? 
Very positive  2.7 2.6 3.7 2.6 6.6 0.7 7.2 2.6 2.1 
Mostly positive  49.8 49.7 48.6 56.6 38.1 44.1 58.2 51.3 50.7 
Mostly negative  29.5 30.1 29 29.1 26.2 33 34.6 22.3 28.8 
Very negative  5.5 5.1 5.9 4.2 17.9 6.1 0 7 5.6 
Don’t know  12.5 12.5 12.8 7.6 11.1 16.1 0 16.9 12.8 
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Analysis of the public opinion polling data from the Levada Center provided 
several important insights into anti-Americanism in Russia and the role of mass media.  
First, public opinion polling data demonstrated that the attitudes towards the United 
States of all of the respondents (with exception of the foreign media users) across various 
mass media sources from 2011 to 2015 followed the same visible trend. There were several 
points in time when Russian views about the U.S. changed drastically, and the first event 
that coincided with the change in Russian public opinion was the election of Vladimir Putin 
in March 2012.   
As Tables 14-18 demonstrated, before Putin was elected president for his third term 
in 2012, the average number of respondents in Russia who expressed positive attitude 
towards the United States across mass media sources was high, varying from 58.8% in July 
2011 to 50.5% in March 2012. Before the election, more than half of the Russian 
respondents held positive views about the United States. At the same time, only about a 
third of respondents (across various mass media audiences) expressed anti-American 
views.  
A year and a half into Putin’s third presidential term, public opinion polls 
demonstrated a major change in views of the public about the United States. By November 
2013, the number of people who expressed pro- and anti-American views reversed. At that 
point, 49.2% expressed negative opinions, and 37.4% expressed positive views about the 
United States.  
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The second major switch in Russian views took place between March and 
September 2014. By early fall, the number of pro-American respondents dropped to 17%, 
while the number of those who expressed anti-American sentiments reached 72.7%.  
A number of important events took place in Russia and the world in those five 
months. Those events included Russia’s annexation of Crimea, widespread international 
criticism of Putin’s actions followed by the imposition of sanctions against the Russian 
Federation by the United States, European Union and other countries, and an escalation of 
military conflict in the Donbass region of Eastern Ukraine.  
These events included severely strained relations between Russian and the West, 
especially the United States. The two countries reached such a historic low point in their 
relationship that a number of experts (Legvod, 2014; Tisdall, 2014; Oliker, 2014) referred 
to it as a “new Cold War.” As described in details in the previous chapters, the change of 
Kremlin policies since the Maidan revolution and annexation of Crimea was followed by 
an anti-American and anti-Western campaign in the Russian mass media, unprecedented 
in post-Soviet Russian history.  
In the following year and a half, Russian views about the United States remained 
consistently negative toward the West, with only a small improvement in July 2015, when 
the number of respondents who expressed positive attitudes towards the United States went 
up to 18.9%.   
The five-year dynamic of Russian public opinion towards the United States 
demonstrated that the sharp increase in anti-American views coincided with the Kremlin’s 
rise in anti-American rhetoric, which was amplified through the use of mass media.   
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The second important outcome of the data analysis was that it demonstrated only a 
slight difference in attitudes towards the United States between audiences of different mass 
media outlets in Russia. Audiences of state TV channels, non-state TV channels, state 
newspapers and non-state newspapers demonstrated somewhat similar views throughout 
the time period, beginning at the end of 2011 through July 2015.  
The biggest difference was found between users of the foreign media and people 
who preferred to get their information from state TV channels and both state and non-state 
newspapers.  It was not possible, however, to use the data about foreign media users for 
any kind of analysis, because the percentage of people who picked this option fell below 
the margin of error. The margin of error for the nationwide surveys conducted by the 
Levada Center does not exceed 3.4 percent, and the percentage of people who use foreign 
media from 2011 to 2015 was considerably less than the margin of error. The same problem 
(total number of respondents was less than a margin of error) was detected with the 
audience of independent newspapers. 
Apart from the data on the foreign media users, the greatest difference in opinion 
about the U.S. was between the audiences of state mass media and the internet users. 
However, the gap between the views of those respondents is not wide. While Russian 
internet users have slightly more positive views of the U.S. compared to the audiences of 
state-controlled mass media, the difference does not exceed 11%. The data also 
demonstrated that with time the gap between opinions of all the groups was shrinking.  
The difference between the audience of state-controlled media and radio listeners 
followed a pattern similar to that of the Internet users.  As for the respondents who preferred 
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to get their information from their neighbors, friends, colleagues – their views about the 
U.S. were very close to the views of the state media consumers.  
The absence of significant difference in attitudes between respondents who prefer 
different sources of information about the country (especially between state and non-state 
mass media) was an unexpected result of the data analysis. Possible explanations for the 
similar levels of anti-Americanism across various media sources are examined in detail in 
the discussion/conclusion chapter.  
Testing the proposed hypothesis on anti-Americanism and media use against the 
data produced the following results:  
Hypothesis 1A: “Use of state-controlled mass media outlets as the primary source 
of news among the Russian public was associated with higher levels of negative attitudes 
towards the United States.” In general this hypothesis was confirmed: in comparison to 
users of other information sources (such as the Internet, radio, 
neighbors/friend/acquaintances) respondents who named state TV stations as their main 
source of information expressed slightly more negative attitudes towards the United States. 
The difference, however, in views about the United States between audiences of state and 
non-state media outlets did not exceed 15% on average.  
Hypothesis 1 B. “Use of independent mass media outlets as the primary source of 
news among the Russian public was associated with lower levels of negative attitudes 
towards the United States.” This hypothesis was not confirmed in regards to non-state TV. 
The level of anti-Americanism among the audience of non-state TV stations did not differ 
significantly from the audience of state TV channels. The audience of non-state newspapers 
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could not be analyzed since the number of respondents was less than the margin of error. 
This hypothesis was not applicable to radio listeners, since the Levada survey did not 
distinguish between state and non-state radio stations.    
Hypothesis 2. “Use of television as a primary source of news among the Russian 
public was associated with the higher levels of negative attitudes towards the United 
States.” This hypothesis was not confirmed, because the difference in negative attitudes 
towards the United between the audience of TV stations and all other source of information 
was not statistically significant, not exceeding 5%.   
In order to test a hypothesis related to trust for mass media and anti-Americanism 
in Russia, the following data was used:  
The data did not support Hypothesis 3 (“Trust for mass media outlets in their 
coverage of domestic and foreign news was associated with the higher levels of negative 
attitudes towards the United States.”). As seen in Table 15, respondents who did not trust 
mass media were slightly more negative about the United States than those trusted mass 
media (57.5% vs. 55.7%). Possible explanations for these results are discussed in the 
following chapter.     
 
Mass media and anti-Americanism: conclusions  
In conclusion, it is important to stress several findings from the analysis of the data 
provided by the Levada Center on anti-Americanism among the Russian public and 
use/trust for mass media. 
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Table 19. Respondents’ attitudes towards the U.S. and their trust for mass media. Data 
from the survey conducted in Russia. The Levada Center, 2015. 
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Number of respondents  793 41 339 289 97 26 
In general, what is your attitude towards the United States today? 
Very positive  2 4.6 2.2 1 3.7 0 
Mostly positive  32.3 28.8 31.8 31.3 37.3 35.5 
Mostly negative  43.5 48 43.3 49.7 27.9 29.9 
Very negative  12.1 9.2 10.9 9.1 28.4 4.9 
Don’t know  10.1 9.3 11.8 8.9 2.7 29.7 
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First, the results showed that the rise of anti-Americanism among the Russian pubic 
was detected across the consumers of various mass news media, including state-controlled 
and non-state broadcasting and print press, as well as, the Internet, radio and interpersonal 
communication. The majority of respondents who preferred different sources of 
information showed similar patterns in their shifting attitudes towards the United States. 
These results call for a possible reevaluation of the nature of so-called state-controlled and 
independent mass media in modern Russia, specifically of their coverage of foreign affairs. 
The homogeneous nature of rising anti-Americanism among respondents who prefer to get 
their information from different sources is discussed in the following chapter, and a number 
of possible explanations are suggested.  
Second, major increases in anti-Americanism among all of the respondents were 
detected by the Levada Center public opinion polls around two points in time: when 
president Putin intensified his anti-western and anti-American rhetoric, and when the 
Russian mass media launched an aggressive anti-American propaganda campaign.  
Third, surprising similarities between attitudes towards the United States among 
the respondents who expressed trust or distrust towards the Russian mass media calls for a 
discussion of the role of mass media in the modern Russian society. Specifically, those 
results call into question the influence of trust in mass media outlets vs. the trust of 
authority figures who use the media as a mechanism to deliver their position to the mass 
public in Russia.  
Fourth, the analysis of the public opinion polling data highlighted the need for 
future research focused on the audiences of alternative sources of information in Russia. 
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Since the number of people who named foreign media and independent newspapers as their 
main sources of information fell beneath the margin of error, it was impossible to 
incorporate those respondents into analysis. It would be useful in future research to focus 
on those two groups to detect the differences between their views and the views of people 
who prefer state-run media outlets as their main source of information.       
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Chapter 6  
Discussion, Conclusions and Observations  
Testing anti-Americanism theories and the soft power thesis in Russia  
Two alternative viewpoints can be distinguished among the literature on anti-
Americanism. The first, represented in works of Hollander, Revel, Rubin and Rubin and 
others, describe anti-Americanism as a syndrome emerging from a cultural predisposition. 
In regards to Russia, some experts (Mendelson & Gerber, 2005; Gans, 2013) argued that 
anti-Americanism is a prominent and inherited feature of the Russian mindset.  
The opposing view, which Chiozza (2010) called the Dimensions of America 
theory, insists that foreign anti-Americanism is not a closed cognitive structure, but rather 
an “aggregation of considerations, predispositions and information” (p 27). Various 
academic works focusing on anti-Americanism in Russia fit into this second category. For 
example, Shlapentokh (2001, 2005, 2011) argued that anti-Americanism in modern Russia 
is an artificially created phenomenon pushed on the Russian public by the elites and 
Russian authorities who employ anti-American propaganda for their own political benefits. 
According to Shlapentokh, “Anti-Americanism in Russia, as well as in most other 
countries, does not come from below, from the general Russian population, but rather from 
above, from the elites. It is the elites, through its ability to control and manipulate the 
media, education and literature, which has the power to either foster or stifle xenophobia” 
(Shlapentokh, 2001, p. 878).  
The statistical analysis in this dissertation investigated the nature of Russian anti-
Americanism and placed it in the context of two alternative viewpoints on anti-
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Americanism. Results from the cluster analysis were especially helpful in addressing this 
issue. Data analysis produced a somewhat paradoxical answer: anti-Americanism in Russia 
seemed to fit both approaches simultaneously. Cluster analysis produced four groups of 
respondents based on their attitudes towards the United States. Two of these clusters 
demonstrated attitudes that are best described as the syndrome approach, while two others 
fit well into Chiozza’s Dimensions of America theory.    
Anti-Americanism attitudes of the first two clusters of respondents (consistently 
and moderately anti-American) fit into the anti-Americanism as a syndrome theory. 
According to the expectation of this approach, people from these two groups seemed to 
display anti-Americanism as a cultural trait that affected their perception of everything 
related to the United States. Such sentiments fit descriptions of anti-Americanism as an 
ideological construct that “systematically and deliberately misconstrues, rejects and 
belittles the American people and the American policy” (Chiozza, 2010, p. 27). 
Two other clusters of respondents (consistently pro-American and paradoxically 
pro-American) demonstrated different attitudes towards various aspects of the United 
States, its people and its application of soft power. Attitudes of these two groups of 
respondents seem to fit the description suggested by Chiozza. Dimension of America 
theory suggested that foreign publics can have opposite feelings simultaneously on various 
aspects of American influence. Analysis of the attitudes of the pro-American clusters of 
respondents produced similar results: those people had negative attitudes towards some 
dimensions of the United States, but were positive about others.    
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These results showed that attitudes of foreign publics towards the United States are 
not homogenous even inside a single country. As the case of Russia demonstrated, views 
of different groups of the population towards the United States differ not only in terms on 
negative or positive attitudes, but in the very nature of what is perceived as negative or 
positive. Data analysis showed that for a significant part of the Russian population anti-
Americanism was a deep seated cultural trait, an ideological lens that affected their 
perception of everything related to the United States. Sentiments of the other parts of the 
population, however, seemed to be a more complex structure: these respondents 
simultaneously held different opinions towards different aspects of the United States and 
its influence.  
This research project demonstrated that both theoretical approaches to the study of 
anti-Americanism can be applicable simultaneously within the context of a single country. 
Public opinion data analysis demonstrated that the Russian society should not be treated as 
a monolithic structure; therefore, a segment of the Russian populace has an ant-American 
ideological bent, but a segment adheres to the dimensions of America model. This is seen, 
however, only if the investigation reaches beneath the surface of public opinion and 
identifies groups within society which hold different values and attitudes.  In order to do 
that, the researcher must apply such statistical analytical methods as regression, factor and 
cluster analysis. These conclusion should be further tested in Russia and in other countries.     
Another theory tested within this research project was the concept of soft power. 
The soft power thesis (Nye 1990, 2004, 2008) suggested that cooperation with other 
countries could be achieved more easily through taking steps designed to increase the 
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appeal and attractiveness the United States. According to this seemingly intuitive logic, 
positive feelings towards the United States could be strengthened if the various aspects of 
the United States, its way of life and power would seem appealing to foreign publics.  
Analysis of the survey data from Russia demonstrated that the relationships 
between attitudes towards the United States and various aspects of American soft power 
differed from results of previous research conducted in other countries. In Russia, 
according to regression modeling, attitudes towards the American people had the strongest 
influence on attitudes towards the United States. At the same time, factor analysis produced 
two independent factors: attitudes towards the U.S. and the American people was 
associated with one factor, and attitudes towards all other aspects of American soft power 
associated with another factor. In the context of the Soft Power thesis these results had 
important implications: in Russia, at least on the level of mass public, American soft power 
(such as American ideas about democracy, or ways of conducting business, or even 
American popular culture) did not seem to promote positive attitude towards the United 
States in general.  
It is important to stress that these results do not disprove the Soft Power thesis as a 
concept. Results of the data analysis, rather, showed that in Russia, specifically at the level 
of mass public opinion, positive attitudes towards various aspects of the American soft 
power did not seem to influence respondents’ attitudes towards the United States. Nye’s 
concept of Soft Power, as well as its implementations through various state-sponsored 
programs, are not usually targeting the general public in a foreign country. In the case of 
Russian-American relations, for example, a number of U.S. governmental programs are 
 
122 
targeted at elites, and are intentionally designed to promote American culture, values and 
way of life to the members of the Russian elites. A number of cultural exchange and 
engagement programs are designed for different professional groups that can be described 
as opinion-makers, such as journalists, members of the arts community, civil society 
activists, politicians, etc. This study was not designed to test the effectiveness of such elite-
oriented programs.       
An indirect indication of the impact of the American soft power on Russian society, 
however, can be seen in the ongoing coordinated governmental efforts to reduce the ability 
of foreign counties and specifically the United States and foreign-supported organizations 
from utilizing soft power in ways that were established during the early years of the Russian 
Federation.  
Since 2012, the Russian authorities have been engaged in a systematic suppression 
of international non-governmental organizations in Russia. Under the pretense of limiting 
foreign influence on domestic affairs in Russia, the so-called “foreign agents” law was 
passed by the Russian Duma in July 2012 (Gorbachev, 2015). The law imposed new 
restrictions on non-state organizations, requiring organization that receive funding from 
abroad and are engaged in “political activity” to register as foreign agents, a loaded term 
in Russian culture. 
This law disrupted the work of various non-governmental organizations, including 
human rights groups, environmental groups, women-rights groups, charities and others. 
Both international NGOs, such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and 
Transparency International and Russian organizations were targeted (Elder 2013). 
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According to John Dalhuisen, Europe and Central Asia Director at Amnesty International, 
"one year after it came into force, the record of the foreign agents law is a grim one. More 
than a thousand NGOs have been inspected and dozens have received warnings. Several of 
the most prominent human rights groups have been fined and some forced to close” 
(Amnesty International, 2013). 
The next move to limit activities of non-governmental organizations took place in 
July 2015, when the Federal Duma voted to create a “patriotic stop-list” of NGOs that 
allegedly present a threat to Russia (Gorbachev, 2015). This law gave the Russian 
government the power to shut down non-governmental organizations without a court order 
if they are suspected to “pose a threat to the Russian constitution or the national security 
(Gorbachev, 2015).” According to media reports, Kostantin Kosachev, head of the 
Federation Council’s Committee for Foreign Affairs and the main sponsor of the bill, 
publicly accused the West of using NGOs of promoting revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia 
(Gorbachev 2015). He stated that “Americans and their allies don’t hide that Russia is 
next,” adding that foreign NGOs should be controlled “in order not to repeat another defeat 
of the country and the nation” (Gorbachev, 2015). 
Such extensive efforts on the part of the Russian government to limit the influence 
of the United States in Russia can serve as an indication that the American soft power is 
regarded as a threat by the Kremlin. These suppressive actions by the Russian authorities 
are tantamount to an admission of the effectiveness of soft power efforts.  
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The dramatic rise of Anti-Americanism in Russia: sociological explanation    
This dissertation examined the sentiments of the Russian public towards the United 
States in order to provide possible explanations of the dramatic shift in the public mood 
and the rise of anti-Americanism in Russia.  
Analysis of public opinion polls conducted by Pew demonstrated that in 2012 the 
general mood of the Russian public towards the United States was cautiously positive. Less 
than three years later, however, the Levada Center survey showed a dramatically different 
picture. As much as 80% of the Russian people have expressed negative views about the 
United States. 
How was it possible for the Russian public to change its mind so quickly and so 
drastically? In order to answer this question, the researcher examined the results of the 
cluster analysis from the 2012 Pew survey in Russia.  
The data analysis produced four clusters of respondents according to their attitudes 
towards the United States and its soft power (see Chapter 5 for details). The “consistently 
anti-American” cluster, which included 26% of the respondents, was hostile to everything 
American: country, people, and soft power. The “moderately anti-American cluster” 
included 19% of the people. Those respondents were quite fond of American pop culture 
and Hollywood, but still disliked everything American, especially the idea of American 
customs and culture being spread in Russia. Combined those two cluster included 45% of 
the respondents.   
A fundamental change in the way the Russian public views the United States was 
attributed not to those who in 2012 already were openly anti-American, but to a change of 
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mindset among those who previously held positive views about the United States. In order 
to address the problem of how and why the majority of Russians changed their attitudes 
from friendly to hostile in just three years, it was necessary to closely examine the views 
and positions of the two pro-American clusters of respondents.        
Based on the data, it is possible to suggest that a fundamental change in the attitude 
of the Russian public was due to the change of opinion among people of the fourth cluster, 
which constituted almost a third of the respondents. People from the so-called “paradoxical 
pro-American” cluster expressed positive views about the United States and the American 
people, but were highly critical about each aspect of the American soft power.   
The positive attitudes of these people towards the United States in 2012 already 
were unstable and inconsistent with their attitudes about other aspects of American 
influence. This group was demonstrating a certain kind of isolationism, which can be 
described as “We are good with Americans as long as they stay in America, but we have 
another way of life and we do not need their values, their style of democracy or even their 
Hollywood.” It is also important to stress that among all respondents in Russia, support for 
Putin was the highest in this cluster.  
Based on the data available about this cluster of respondents, it would be safe to 
suggest that when Putin significantly changed his stand on the United States, the members 
of this cluster, who were highly supportive of him, changed their attitudes towards America 
as well. When the Kremlin's policy became openly anti-American, member of the fourth 
cluster changed their attitude towards America to negative, since the pro-American 
attitudes expressed in 2012 were never deep-rooted. 
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In order to understand the isolationist mindset of this “paradoxically pro-American” 
cluster, it is important to take into an account their attitudes not only towards the U.S. and 
the American people, but to spreading American ideas and customs in Russia. The attitudes 
towards the influence of the United States on Russia among these respondents was highly 
negative (the sum of positive and negative answers to this question was -80).  
Positive attitudes of this cluster towards the United States and the American people 
can be explained by Russians generally having good views towards any other people, as 
long as they stay where they are and do not try to interfere with Russia and its way of life. 
According to this explanation, members of the paradox cluster approved of Americans 
because they were good with people in general, but only as long as they do not try interfere 
and do not try to impose on Russia their values, ideas and culture.  
It is quite logical that these people were most receptive to the propaganda campaign 
that was initiated by the Kremlin and consistently portrayed the United States as an 
aggressor that attempts to intervene in Russian domestic affairs, supports and promotes 
anti-Russian color revolutions in neighboring countries and, generally speaking, is a hostile 
foreign power that is threatening Russia and is focused on preventing Russia from “getting 
up from her knees” and achieving long-deserved greatness.  
Public opinion data analysis provided a probable explanation of how it was possible 
for a majority of the Russian population to change their views drastically over a relatively 
short period of time. In addition, close examination of two trends in public opinion (anti-
Americanism and support for president Putin) from 2012 to 2015 provided an insight into 
the reasoning and strategy behind Putin’s increasingly anti-American public stand.      
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Putin’s incentives to fuel anti-Americanism in Russia  
From the perspective of 2015, results of public opinion polls discussed in a section 
above look particularly curious. In the context of aggressive actions by Russia, such as the 
annexation of Crimea, ongoing attempts of further destabilization of Ukraine, continued 
military support for insurgents in the Donbass region, and the escalating Russian military 
presence in Syria, various experts see Putin as the initiator and the leader of Russian 
revanchism and aggression. According to polling data in 2012, before the shift in Russian 
foreign policy and the escalation of conflict between Russian with the West and the United 
States, Putin’s increasing anti-Western, anti-American views were shared by a substantial 
part of the Russian public. 
In the beginning of Putin’s third term as a president in 2012, those respondents who 
expressed anti-American views were slightly less supportive of Putin than those who felt 
positive about the United States. These results were supported by previous research: 
Public opinion evidence from the early and mid-2000s (Whitefield, 2005, 
2009) indicates that Putin and his government was significantly less likely 
to be supported by nationalist and anti-Western citizens and that there were 
only very limited differences socially and ideologically between his 
supporters and those for so-called liberal politicians (Chaisty & Whitefield, 
2015). 
 
By 2015, however, negative views held by the two “anti-American” clusters of 
respondents were found to be parallel to the official Kremlin position that was constantly 
being broadcasted by state-controlled mass media. In other words, anti-American attitudes 
that were expressed by a significant part of the Russian public in 2012, later aligned with 
the increasing anti-Western policy and rhetoric of the Kremlin.  
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Increasing levels of public support for Putin and his policies were detected through 
public opinion polls from 2012 to 2015. In June 2015, Putin’s support rating reached its 
then-to-date peak of 89%. The data analysis demonstrated that the pro-American clusters 
of the respondents (around 55% at that time) in Russia were already more supportive of 
Putin in 2012 than the anti-American clusters. Thus, such a drastic increase in the number 
of Russians who support Putin means that the two anti-American clusters of respondents, 
who were slightly more critical of him in 2012, in fact moved to show strong support for 
the president by 2015.  
Such conclusions are supported by the results of other polls conducted by Levada 
that demonstrate the role strong foreign policy plays in shaping people’s evaluation of Putin 
as a leader. For example, in August 2014, respondents named “strengthening of the 
international position of Russia” as the main accomplishment of Putin during his years in 
office (Levada Center, 2014).  
It is safe to say that since Putin was elected for a third presidential term in March 
2012, he effectively used anti-Western and anti-American rhetoric to boost his own popular 
support among the Russian public.  
So what were the possible motivations for the Kremlin to switch positions and 
employ ethno-nationalist and anti-Western rhetoric?   
At the end of Medvedev’s term, Putin’s prospects of triumphantly returning to the 
Kremlin in 2012 started to look bleak. Throughout 2011, support for the Russian leadership 
and the ruling United Russia party declined. Accusations of corruption on the highest levels 
of the Russian government, propagated by oppositional leaders, began to have an effect on 
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public opinion. Putin’s public announcement that he would be running for a third term, and 
the following parliamentary elections resulted in massive public protests in Moscow and 
throughout the country. Protesters soon changed their focus from allegations of fraudulent 
election to promoting a slogan, “Russia without Putin,” openly opposing Putin’s third term.   
Strong nationalistic, anti-Western and anti-American campaigns initiated by Putin 
provided the Kremlin with at least two benefits. First, pro-Western protesters and 
opposition, who could potentially present a threat to Putin’s rule if they would be able to 
appeal to broader social base, were successfully marginalized and discredited in the eyes 
of the Russian population as sellouts to the hostile West. In addition, the new propaganda 
campaign that portrayed Russia as being threatened by enemies had a rally-around-the-flag 
effect, boosting popular support for Putin and distracting the population from a slowing 
economy.  
After the Maidan revolution in Kiev, intensified anti-American rhetoric, according 
to Volkov (2015), served as means to discredit anti-establishment protests and to prevent 
such events from happening in Russia:  
With the memory of the Orange Revolution still fresh, the Kremlin most 
likely sought to portray Euromaidan as an American project in order to 
discredit public protest sentiment as quickly as possible, since Russian and 
Ukrainian surveys conducted at the rallies showed it to be similar in origin 
to the Moscow-based protest movement of 2011-2012. Russian authorities 
did not want a successful spin-off of the civil protest to emerge on Russian 
soil (Volkov, 2015).   
 
Some experts argued that there was an additional incentive for Putin to use anti-
Western nationalistic rhetoric, also rooted in the domestic political situation. Chaisty & 
Whitefield (2015) argued that after the financial crisis of 2008/2009, the nationalist 
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movement was gaining popularity in Russia, and could possibly present a threat to Putin’s 
third presidential term. The authors also argued that the crisis in Ukraine forced Putin to 
take an even stronger anti-Western and nationalistic stance: “If Putin fails to deliver in 
Ukraine, the possibility of a challenge to his authority from a more radical nationalist 
agenda is likely to be greater than it was before the start of the crisis.”  
 
The role of state-controlled mass media in promoting anti-American attitudes  
Regardless of the specific reasoning behind his actions, in late 2011 and early 2012 
Putin began to openly express anti-Western and anti-American views, blaming the West 
and the United States for financing and organizing the protest movement and accusing the 
West of intervening in Russian affairs. After the beginning of the crisis in Ukraine, the 
annexation of Crimea and the escalating civil war in Ukraine’s Donbass region, anti-
American rhetoric on the part of the Russian authorities intensified significantly, causing a 
sharp spike in anti-American attitudes among the Russian people.  
Most experts agreed that state-controlled mass media played a vital role in both the 
rise of anti-Americanism in Russia and Putin’s growing popularity (Remnik, 2014; 
Gudkov, 2014; 2015; Benetts, 2015; Volkov, 2015; Tavernese, 2015). Analysis of public 
opinion data conducted for this research project provided additional insights into the 
relations between Russian mass media and anti-Americanism.       
One of the interesting findings of the data analysis was a slight difference in 
attitudes towards the United States between audiences of different mass media outlets in 
Russia. Audiences of state TV channels, non-state TV channels, state newspapers and non-
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state newspapers demonstrated somewhat similar views throughout the time period, 
beginning at the end of 2011 through July 2015. The biggest difference in opinion about 
the U.S. was found between the audiences of state mass media and the internet users: 
Russian internet users had slightly more positive views of the U.S. compared to the 
audiences of state-controlled mass media, but the difference did not exceed 11%. The data 
also demonstrated that from 2011 to 2015 the gap between opinions of all the groups of 
media users was narrowing.  
These results may seem to be counter intuitive and challenge the notion about the 
leading role of state-controlled mass media in fueling anti-Americanism in Russia. These 
results point at a different outcome. The similarity of attitudes towards the United States 
of those respondents who preferred to use state controlled media and those who used other 
news sources could indicate not so much a lack of influence of media coverage on people’s 
views about the United States, but rather point out the homogeneous and unified approach 
to the coverage of the United States by various news sources in Russia, including those that 
are under direct state control and those that were labeled “non-state” in the surveys.  
It is also important to note the meaning of the categories “state media” and “non-
state media.” The common-sense assumption about the differences between state and non-
state media outlets would be that the second category would be independent and fall outside 
of the governmental control. Indeed, even in 2015, such media outlets existed in Russia: 
TV Station Rain, newspaper Novaya Gazeta, radio station Echo of Moscow and others. 
These outlets were well-known for their independent editorial policy, Western standards 
of journalism and frequent defiance of official Kremlin position.  
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One should be cautious, however, to assume that when respondents of the Levada 
survey chose the option of non-state newspaper or non-state television that they had in 
mind media outlets described above. In Russia, a great number of media outlets both on 
the federal and local levels were not owned by the state, but were under governmental 
control in terms of editorial policy.  This control was implemented by a number of 
mechanisms, and ownership of media outlets was only one of such tactics. Aside from 
direct ownership of the media, the Russian authorities were known to use the following 
mechanisms as a means of influencing editorial policies and shaping coverage of events:  
- Promoting practices of self-censorship in the mass media community;  
- Harassing of media owners and journalists including physical violence; 
- Securing partial ownership of stock of media holdings; 
- Enacting media laws and other legislation designed to allow authorities to 
punish outlets and journalists who do not comply with the Kremlin’s positions 
and policies; 
- Controlling of the judiciary by the executive branch by allowing biased ruling 
against media outlets and journalists; 
- Providing media subsidies that many outlets require to remain solvent but also 
give editorial control to the subsidizer; 
An argument can be made that news outlets not owned by the state but still under 
governmental influence through the tactics described above would be placed by the 
respondents into the category of non-state media. This would mean that since their editorial 
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policy and coverage of foreign affairs was influenced by the state, the survey showed no 
substantial difference in attitudes between audience of state and non-state mass media.    
Results of the data analysis demonstrated that major increases in anti-Americanism 
among all of the respondents were detected by the Levada Center public opinion polls 
around two points in time: when the Kremlin intensified its anti-Western and anti-
American rhetoric, and when Russian mass media launched an aggressive anti-American 
propaganda campaign. The next section includes a discussion of the possible reasons 
behind the successes of anti-American propaganda in Russia.   
 
The role of other factors and institutions in promoting anti-Americanism   
This dissertation was designed to study the rise of anti-Americanism in Russia as 
was detected through public opinion polls since 2011-2012, and to examine the role of the 
state-controlled mass media in promoting anti-American sentiments among the Russian 
public. While the focus of this dissertation was on the influence of mass media on public 
attitudes of the Russian population towards the United States, mass media are not the only 
factor that shapes public perceptions of a foreign nation.  
Previous research on nation branding and public diplomacy and soft power 
described a variety of other factors as influencing agents, including popular culture, 
interpersonal extra-national engagement, business interactions, consuming foreign 
products, as well as many other interactions between nations (Nye, 1990, 2004; Dinnie, 
2010).  
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In addition, a number of the agents of socialization (or social institutions), such as 
family, peer groups, school, church and others affect human behavior and worldviews 
(Macionis & Gerber, 2011). In the case of Russia, such institutions as formal education, 
the Russian Orthodox Church, formal and informal societal networks (labor unions, youth 
organizations, etc.) – all have an influence on how the Russian people view the world and 
the United States. 
One reason this dissertation focused primarily on mass media was an argument 
made by several prominent scholars about the central role of mass media, and specifically 
television, in the socialization in Russian society (Gudkov, 2014; Kratasyuk, 2006). 
Gudkov argued that the socialization role of mass media became much more prominent in 
Russia as compared to the Soviet Union:     
The Soviet system was based on holding an individual as a hostage. The 
Soviet people had been held hostage by all sorts of groups; not to be thrown 
out of the society, one had all the time to show loyalty to their place of work, 
study and so on. This capillary structure of social control, was running 
through the whole body of society, through all the production teams, the 
Komsomol, the party, and kept the person under control.... The current 
propaganda works by controlling information space. It's a different type of 
manipulation of public consciousness. The one who defines reality through 
the media, also controls people’s minds (Gudkov, 2014).     
 
Limitations of the study  
Several limitations affected the scope of the outcome of research but not the quality 
of the analysis that was completed. First, there were study design limitations. This project 
was designed to utilize secondary data, i.e. results of surveys conducted in Russia by 
independent polling organizations. Thus, the researcher did not have an opportunity to 
influence the development or content of the questions, but had to use existing data.  
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A single database including all the survey questions important for this study did not 
exist. This project, therefore, utilized data from two widely respected polling firms (Pew 
Research Center and the Levada Center), which presented additional issues with both data 
sets. The researcher did not have direct access to the actual survey results of the Levada 
polls, and had to rely on descriptive statistics provided by the that organization. While the 
Pew dataset was available online in SPSS format, only one wave of surveys conducted in 
Russia in 2012 included all the questions needed for this project. This made tracking 
longitudinal changes in public opinion not possible.   
Another possible limitation is that this project did not include content analysis of 
news stories about the United States in Russian mass media. This, however, was 
intentional. Conclusions about the rise of anti-American coverage in Russian media from 
2012 to 2015 were rather based on reviews of various other sources, including reports by 
international press freedom and human rights organizations, news reports, interviews of 
experts published in various Russian and international mass media outlets and other 
sources.  This approach allowed the primary focus to be on the data analysis in question 
and the statistical methods employed which revealed insights not gained through content 
analysis.    
The data limitations resulted in the exclusion of several categories of respondents 
from the data analysis. In the Levada polls, it was not possible to use the data about foreign 
media users or those respondents who preferred to get information from independent 
newspapers for any kind of analysis, because the percentage of people who have chosen 
this option was below the margin of error.  
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These limitations point to future research needs and do not dilute the value of the 
analysis contained in this dissertation. 
 
Suggestions for Future Research 
Future research should incorporate additional public opinion polls, including 
surveys designed to explore in-depth attitudes found within audiences of foreign media and 
independent newspapers. Such surveys should include questions on specific media outlets 
that are known to have coverage of foreign affairs that stand as an alternative to the official 
Kremlin line.  In addition, it would be of interest to consider an investigation of the 
differences in coverage of the United States by various categories of Russian news media 
(such as federal/local, state owned/independent) with a specific focus on the degree of 
variation and intensity of reporting determined to be “negative.” This can be accomplished 
via a combination of qualitative and quantitative content analysis.   
Apart from traditional media outlets, there is a plethora of non-official news 
generating and broadcasting mechanisms by various organizations, including but not 
limited to the Orthodox Church, labor unions, and youth associations. Such organizations 
produce news content and deliver it to their audiences using various means of 
communication, including newsletters, social media, blogs and others. The rhetoric and 
news content of these organizations can directly influence their audiences, but is also often 
used by traditional media in Russia as sources for more broadly disseminated news stories. 
An investigation of such alternative sources of information and their audiences could 
expand our understanding of anti-Americanism and its sources in Russia.   
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The pro- or anti-American sentiments and attitudes of frequent Internet users in 
Russia could be the topic of both a stand-alone stream of research or as a comparative 
companion category. A growing number of Russians who use the Internet, combined with 
efforts of the Russian authorities to tighten control over the use of the Internet and to extend 
their presence in the in the online sphere, indicates the growing role of the Internet as a 
primary news source for the Russian public. Future research could include analysis of the 
information-seeking behavior online, investigation of the coverage and framing of the 
United States in online media, study of the of viral news stories regarding the United States 
on social networks, and an examination of the views of the Internet users in comparison 
with Russian who prefer other sources of information.  
In addition, qualitative studies could greatly contribute to the understanding of the 
phenomenon of anti-Americanism in Russia. A number of related topics could be best 
studied through the lens of the humanistic perspective, including both textual analysis of 
mass media text and analysis of human experiences. Qualitative textual analysis of the 
news stories would be very helpful, because it would produce a rich description of the 
themes that dominate the coverage of the United States in Russian mass media. 
Examination of the experiences of journalists and editors working at state-controlled or 
independent mass media outlets through deep interviews could enhance our understanding 
of the role of media in promoting anti-American attitudes in Russia.     
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Observations  
Winston Churchill famously said that, “Russia is a riddle wrapped in a mystery 
inside an enigma.” This was true during his time as Prime Minister of Great Britain and it 
continues to be true during the new era of a reborn Russian Federation following the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. It is not, however, a riddle without an answer or a mystery 
without clues. The Russian mindset can be better understood through in-depth studies of 
public opinion. This is especially true in regards to anti-American sentiment and foreign 
policy manuevering.  
Counter to what many in the West believe, it is not President Putin who ultimately 
sets Russia’s course. It is the Russian people. Putin encourages that public opinion by 
tapping into the centuries-old longing for empire that is so deeply imprinted on Russian 
culture, as well as warning of enemies at the proverbial national gate. Public opinion is 
paramount to Russian authorities’ ability to act, that may be most exceptional.  
Considering that Putin has consolidated political judicial and economic power very 
effectively, and considering that the state controls and/or influences almost all media 
content, one would initially place little value on the influence of public opinion. When the 
King controls the kingdom why does the opinion of the serf matter? 
But one has to look beyond traditional statistical analysis and use tools more suited 
for identifying predisposed attitudes and behaviors that group the population in ways that 
reveal what otherwise would remain hidden. The additional statistical methods employed 
and discussed at length earlier include cluster, factor and regression analysis. Emerging 
from this data is the picture of a Russian public that can both love and hate the United 
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States simultaneously, can trust and mistrust mass media simultaneously while also 
increasing its support for Putin despite the burden of sanctions and economic difficulties.  
This is possible because the Russian public is not a single homogeneous amalgamation of 
opinion. It is a public whose fabric is woven with often conflicting notions: a historic 
memory of a Soviet empire past, elusive dreams of a democratic future just beyond reach, 
a disillusionment with a West that turned its back and yet still a quiet longing for the idea 
that is America.  
As entrenched as he was in 2015, Putin was a single leader who like all leaders 
would eventually leave his seat of power willingly or otherwise. Will this bottom-up 
pressure on those in power, which is rooted in and defined by strong nationalism, anti-
Western and anti-American views, and cultural isolationism combined with a deep longing 
for expanding Russia’s influence as a great power, remain?  
This research project suggests the answer is to the question is, yes. Data indicates 
that these national characteristics and attitudes, while strengthened by Putin using mass 
media and other means, were not created by him and they will not disappear after he leaves. 
Finally, reinforcing this opinion is the fact that the Russian public seems to have 
little desire for alternatives to anything mainstream, not only in politics but also in 
information consumption. Regardless of the degree of governmental control over mass 
media in Russia, it would be a mistake to think that the Russian public does not have access 
to alternative sources of information about domestic and foreign affairs. Media outlets 
openly critical of Putin still existed. More than 70% of Russians have access to the Internet, 
where any interested party can find alternative information. Despite this, polling data 
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shows that a majority of Russians do not use these sources and agree with the Kremlin’s 
framing of foreign affairs.  
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Western powers, including the United 
States, increased their use of soft power hoping that with a more intense pro-American, 
pro-Western message the Russian public would be persuaded to walk away from what these 
powers deemed a negative point of view. This logic suggested that media freedom and 
access to alternative information can influence transitional societies and lead them on the 
path of democratization. The example of Russia shows, however, that mere access to 
alternative information does not mean people will use these sources and/or trust them.  
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